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10 YEARS OF THE UYGHUR GENOCIDE

*A Comprehensive Report on China's Systematic
Persecution of the Uyghur People*

2016 – 2026

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2016 - 2026

Commissioned by the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) / Uyghur Center for Democracy and Human Rights (UZDM)

World Uyghur Congress (WUC)

The World Uyghur Congress is an international organization that represents the collective interest of the Uyghur people. The WUC promotes democracy, human rights, and freedom for the Uyghur people through peaceful, nonviolent, and democratic means to determine their future. The WUC was founded in 2004 and advocates for the civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights of the Uyghur people within international institutions, such as the EU and the UN. The WUC regularly engages with UN mechanisms, including with treaty body reviews, and has taken part in the previous cycles of the Universal Periodic Review on China. We also submit policy recommendations to national governments. WUC supports Uyghur refugees and asylum seekers and offers capacity building training to Uyghur youth in the diaspora.

The Uyghur Center for Democracy and Human Rights (UZDM)

The Uyghur Center for Democracy and Human Rights (UZDM) is a Berlin-based association founded on 13 April 2019 in Berlin, Germany, that promotes democratic values within the global Uyghur community and works to foster peaceful international understanding. UZDM cooperates with the World Uyghur Congress and supports its broader advocacy goals through public outreach and information campaigns. UZDM aims to raise awareness about the human rights violations against Uyghurs in East Turkistan.



"These abuses are continuing; in fact, they have never stopped."

Turgunjan Alawdun, President of the World Uyghur Congress, April 2026

"The international community must not act in 10 years, it has a responsibility to act now."

Dolkun Isa, President of The Uyghur Center for Democracy and Human Rights (UZDM)



Table of Contents

Foreword.....	5
Section 1: Introduction - The Gap Between Narrative and Reality	6
Section 2: The Crimes Committed by the People's Republic of China	8
A. Mass Detention and the Carceral Pipeline.....	8
The Scale of Detention	8
Conditions of Detention	8
The Carceral Pipeline: From Camps to Prisons	9
B. The Surveillance State	10
The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP).....	11
Physical Surveillance Infrastructure	11
Digital Surveillance of the Diaspora.....	13
C. Forced Labour.....	13
The Labour Transfer Programme	14
The Global Supply Chain Dimension	15
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and Its Enforcement.....	15
D. Religious Persecution.....	16
The Destruction of Mosques	16
Criminalisation of Religious Practice.....	17
Persecution of Scholars and Intellectuals.....	17
E. Cultural Genocide, Erasure of Uyghur Identity, and Sinicisation	18
The Destruction of the Uyghur Language	18
The Demolition of the Cultural Landscape	19
Sinicisation of the Physical Landscape	19
The Propaganda of Performed Normalcy	19
F. The Forcible Transfer of Children.....	20
Scale and Operation of the Boarding School System.....	20
G. Forced Contraception, Sterilisation, and Demographic Warfare.....	21
The Statistical Evidence	21
The Mechanisms of Demographic Coercion.....	22
Coerced Inter-ethnic Marriage	22
H. Organ Harvesting: A Serious and Growing Allegation	22
UN and Expert Concern	22
The Congressional Evidence	23
The East Turkistan Transplant Expansion	24
I. Enforced Disappearances	24



High-Profile Cases.....	24
J. Transnational Repression -- The Long Arm of the Surveillance State	24
Misuse of INTERPOL.....	25
Passport and Document Controls	25
The Weaponisation of Family	26
Illegal Deportations.....	26
Digital Surveillance and Cyberattacks	26
Clandestine Police Stations	26
Violations of International Law	27
Section 3: The Reengineering of Repression: Three Phases of Deliberate Adaptation	28
Section 4: What Remains to Be Done - Gaps and Recommendations	30
I. Mass Detention, the Carceral Pipeline, and the Children's Crisis.....	30
II. The Surveillance State.....	31
III. Forced Labour and Supply Chain Accountability	31
IV. Religious Persecution and Cultural Genocide	32
V. Enforced Disappearances.....	33
VI. The UN Accountability Gap	33
VII. Transnational Repression.....	34
VIII. Organ Harvesting.....	35
Section 5: CONCLUSION	36
ANNEXURE I: International Response - What Has Been Achieved	37
ANNEXURE II: Historical Context and Timeline.....	40

FOREWORD

In September 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a high-profile visit to East Turkistan, which Beijing designates the "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region," to mark the seventieth anniversary of the region's establishment under the People's Republic of China. Colourful celebrations were staged, traditional dances performed and images of smiling Uyghur children were broadcast to international cameras. The message from Beijing was that "Xinjiang" is stable, prosperous and at peace.

In the same period, the World Uyghur Congress was documenting the testimony of Zhang Yabo, a Han Chinese police officer who had spent nine years enforcing the Communist Party's repressive apparatus in Hotan Prefecture and who had fled to Germany. His testimony, finally published in April 2026, described routine beatings and torture, rape during interrogation, forced labour transfers, and deaths resulting from abuse.

This report marks ten years since the systematic genocide of the Uyghur people at the hands of the Chinese administrative machinery. It is a record of crimes. It is also a record of survival, advocacy and, resistance. It draws on survivor testimony, leaked government documents, satellite imagery, academic research, whistleblower accounts, investigative journalism and the findings of international legal and human rights institutions to present a comprehensive account of both the crimes committed against the Uyghur people and the international response to those crimes.

The picture that emerges is clear. What is happening to the Uyghur people meets the legal, moral and empirical definition of genocide. That genocide is ongoing. It has changed shape and gone underground. But it has never stopped.

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION - THE GAP BETWEEN NARRATIVE AND REALITY



Xi Jinping billboard in Xinjiang by Carsten ten Brink (via Flickr)

On 23 September 2025, state broadcaster CCTV showed Xi Jinping participating in celebrations marking the first time a CCP General Secretary attended an event commemorating the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s” anniversary.¹ He was surrounded by colourfully dressed performers in Ürümqi, the regional capital of what Beijing calls “Xinjiang”. Uyghur women in embroidered costumes danced. Schoolchildren waved flags. Officials offered speeches about "ethnic unity," "shared prosperity" and the successes of China's poverty alleviation programme. The seventieth anniversary celebration was designed to project normality to domestic and international audiences alike.

The performance was calculated. In the weeks surrounding Xi's visit, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) released new findings on the systematic use of boarding schools to separate Uyghur children from their parents.² The Uyghur Human Rights Project published updated estimates placing the number of Uyghurs currently imprisoned at one in every seventeen.³ The World Uyghur Congress was in contact with Zhang Yabo, a defecting police officer whose testimony would confirm what satellite imagery, leaked

¹ Xi Attends Grand Gathering in Celebration of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region's 70th Founding Anniv. CCTV Video News Agency, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=29ji-3SuKtI>

² Congressional Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2025, available at <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/2025-12/fullcecc2025.pdf>

³ UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region With World's Highest Prison Rate, Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at <https://uhrp.org/insights/uhrp-analysis-finds-1-in-26-uyghurs-imprisoned-in-region-with-worlds-highest-prison-rate/>



documents, and survivor accounts had long suggested: the system of repression had not ended. It had been deliberately reengineered to evade international scrutiny.⁴

This report is a comprehensive account of the evidence accumulated since 2016, the year in which the current systematic escalation began. It draws on seven categories of primary evidence:

- Survivor testimony: accounts from individuals who experienced the camps, forced labour and family separation firsthand.
- Leaked government documents: the China Cables (2019), the Xinjiang Papers (2019), the Xinjiang Police Files (2022), the Karakash List, Aksu List, the Nankai Report, and associated materials.
- Satellite imagery analysis: principally from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which identified more than 385 suspected detention facilities.
- Academic research: scholarship by Dr. Adrian Zenz (Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation), Darren Byler (Simon Fraser University), Joanne Smith Finley (Newcastle University), Dru Gladney, Magnus Fiskesjö (Cornell University), and others.
- Investigative journalism: reporting by the BBC, The New York Times, Der Spiegel, Radio Free Asia, BuzzFeed News, The Guardian, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.
- Official Chinese government data: demographic statistics, judicial records, and planning documents that, read carefully, corroborate the scale of repression.
- International legal and institutional findings: the OHCHR 2022 report, the Uyghur Tribunal verdict (2021), the CERD referral to the Office on Genocide Prevention (2022), and legislative findings in the United States, European Union, and multiple national parliaments.

This report presents evidence of how the Chinese state has subjected the Uyghur people to a programme of persecution encompassing arbitrary mass detention, forced labour, cultural erasure, forcible family separation, suppression of religious practice, systematic surveillance, and measures designed to reduce Uyghur birth rates. The balance of evidence, assessed by the standards of international law, points unmistakably to genocide.

Up to 3 Million Uyghurs detained in internment camps	500,000+ Uyghurs formally imprisoned by 2021	3.4 Million Forced labour deployments recorded in 2025	880,500 Children in state-run boarding schools
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⁴ Unprecedented Whistleblower Testimony from Inside China's Police Apparatus Confirms Xinjiang Forced Labor Is Intensifying, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, available at <https://victimsofcommunism.org/unprecedented-whistleblower-testimony-from-inside-chinas-police-apparatus-confirms-xinjiang-forced-labor-is-intensifying/>

SECTION 2: THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as acts "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" through: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births; and forcibly transferring children. This section presents the evidence of genocidal acts being committed against the Uyghur people.

A. Mass Detention and the Carceral Pipeline

The mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in East Turkistan constitutes the most extensive system of extrajudicial detention documented anywhere in the world since the end of the Second World War. By 2018, China had established a sprawling network of purpose-built facilities holding up to 3 million people without charge, trial, or access to legal counsel.

The Scale of Detention

China has never disclosed its own figures for the number of Uyghurs imprisoned or detained. However, estimates suggest that up to 3 million Uyghurs have been imprisoned or detained in Chinese camps and prisons. A study of Chinese judicial statistics by the Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP), published in 2024, found that approximately one in every seventeen Uyghurs had been incarcerated as of 2024, an incarceration rate higher than any other population on Earth.⁵

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Xinjiang Data Project used commercial satellite imagery to identify at least 385 suspected detention facilities. The project's interactive database shows the locations, construction dates, and expansion patterns of these facilities across the region.⁶

Conditions of Detention

The China Cables, leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in 2019, included a classified "Telegram": a set of operating instructions for camp officials. The document specifies that detainees must be prevented from communicating with their families; that there shall be "strict secrecy" about the location and operation of facilities; that detainees must demonstrate "genuine transformation" before any release is considered; and that facilities must be managed as "closed, strict, and isolated" institutions.⁷

⁵ UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region With World's Highest Prison Rate, Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at <https://uhrp.org/insights/uhrp-analysis-finds-1-in-26-uyghurs-imprisoned-in-region-with-worlds-highest-prison-rate/>

⁶ Xinjiang Data Project, available at <https://xjdp.aspi.org.au/map/>

⁷ China Cables, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, available at <https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/>

The Xinjiang Police Files, leaked to Adrian Zenz, who then shared them with a consortium of 14 media organisations including the BBC and Der Spiegel, include internal photographs from the camps, guard instructions to "shoot to kill" anyone attempting to escape, and documents detailing the systematic torture of detainees. The files reveal that people were imprisoned for offences including: possessing an unapproved religious text; praying outside designated times; communicating with relatives abroad; wearing a face veil; maintaining a beard; having too many children; and refusing to watch state television.⁸

"I can still hear those screams. I have nightmares about them. I witnessed the beating and torture of Uyghur detainees. A colleague raped a female detainee during interrogation. I saw deaths from the abuses. The conditions were abysmal."

Zhang Yabo, former "Xinjiang" police officer, testimony published in Der Spiegel, April 2026



Photo via the Xinjiang Judicial Administration WeChat account

Zhang Yabo served in multiple roles within the detention system from 2014 to 2023. His testimony describes: routine physical torture including beatings and sleep deprivation; sexual violence, including the rape of a female detainee during interrogation; deaths in custody occurring "almost weekly"; collective punishment of entire families; and arbitrary detention quotas requiring police officers to produce weekly lists of "suspected terrorist activity." Officers routinely fabricated charges to meet these targets.⁹

The Carceral Pipeline: From Camps to Prisons

⁸ Xinjiang Police Files, available at <https://www.xinjiangpolicefiles.org/>

⁹ Unprecedented Whistleblower Testimony from Inside China's Police Apparatus Confirms Xinjiang Forced Labor Is Intensifying, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, available at <https://victimsofcommunism.org/unprecedented-whistleblower-testimony-from-inside-chinas-police-apparatus-confirms-xinjiang-forced-labor-is-intensifying/>

When China claimed in 2019 that the camps had been "closed," international observers hoped this represented a genuine improvement. The evidence demonstrates that it was a cosmetic redesign. Zhang Yabo confirms that in his jurisdiction in Hotan Prefecture, detainees released from extrajudicial camps were, in the majority of cases, transferred to formal prisons under manufactured criminal charges. He estimates that "half or more" of released detainees subsequently received formal prison sentences of five to twenty years, handed down in proceedings lasting minutes, with no independent legal representation.¹⁰

Analysis of judicial statistics for East Turkistan by the UHRP reveals an extraordinary surge in criminal sentencing in the period from 2017 to 2021 with no precedent in the region's administrative history. More than 500,000 individuals were sentenced to prison in East Turkistan between 2017 and 2021, an incarceration rate more than thirty times higher than the Chinese national average.¹¹

In early 2023, authorities issued new orders requiring security forces to meet detention quotas for short-term arbitrary detentions. Zhang Yabo confirms that authorities simultaneously issued strict orders to destroy all documentation related to these detentions, an instruction designed to prevent international detection.¹² The destruction of files was itself a form of evidence: it demonstrated the awareness of the authorities regarding the illegal nature of the detentions.

B. The Surveillance State

East Turkistan is, by every available metric, the most densely surveilled territory on Earth. The surveillance infrastructure constructed in East Turkistan since 2017 represents a system of population control unprecedented in its technical sophistication. For the Uyghur people, the knowledge that every movement, every communication, every religious practice, and every social relationship is monitored and recorded produces a form of pervasive self-censorship that extends into the most intimate aspects of daily life.

¹⁰ Unprecedented Whistleblower Testimony from Inside China's Police Apparatus Confirms Xinjiang Forced Labor Is Intensifying, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, available at <https://victimsofcommunism.org/unprecedented-whistleblower-testimony-from-inside-chinas-police-apparatus-confirms-xinjiang-forced-labor-is-intensifying/>

¹¹ UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region With World's Highest Prison Rate, Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at <https://uhrp.org/insights/uhrp-analysis-finds-1-in-26-uyghurs-imprisoned-in-region-with-worlds-highest-prison-rate/>

¹² Unprecedented Whistleblower Testimony from Inside China's Police Apparatus Confirms Xinjiang Forced Labor Is Intensifying, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, available at <https://victimsofcommunism.org/unprecedented-whistleblower-testimony-from-inside-chinas-police-apparatus-confirms-xinjiang-forced-labor-is-intensifying/>

APPENDIX I

出境未归人员亲属送培学员

序号	姓名	入籍时间	民族	身份证号	步骤	村(社区)	姓名	国籍	备注	三查情况	研判结论
1	第一培训中心	2017-5-23	哈萨克族	6532221970060216602	合并	乌鲁木齐市沙依布拉克区	李斯恒	中国	1. 出境: 26周 2. 出境: 26周 3. 出境: 26周 4. 出境: 26周 5. 出境: 26周 6. 出境: 26周 7. 出境: 26周 8. 出境: 26周 9. 出境: 26周 10. 出境: 26周 11. 出境: 26周 12. 出境: 26周 13. 出境: 26周 14. 出境: 26周 15. 出境: 26周 16. 出境: 26周 17. 出境: 26周 18. 出境: 26周 19. 出境: 26周 20. 出境: 26周 21. 出境: 26周 22. 出境: 26周 23. 出境: 26周 24. 出境: 26周 25. 出境: 26周 26. 出境: 26周 27. 出境: 26周 28. 出境: 26周 29. 出境: 26周 30. 出境: 26周 31. 出境: 26周 32. 出境: 26周 33. 出境: 26周 34. 出境: 26周 35. 出境: 26周 36. 出境: 26周 37. 出境: 26周 38. 出境: 26周 39. 出境: 26周 40. 出境: 26周 41. 出境: 26周 42. 出境: 26周 43. 出境: 26周 44. 出境: 26周 45. 出境: 26周 46. 出境: 26周 47. 出境: 26周 48. 出境: 26周 49. 出境: 26周 50. 出境: 26周 51. 出境: 26周 52. 出境: 26周 53. 出境: 26周 54. 出境: 26周 55. 出境: 26周 56. 出境: 26周 57. 出境: 26周 58. 出境: 26周 59. 出境: 26周 60. 出境: 26周 61. 出境: 26周 62. 出境: 26周 63. 出境: 26周 64. 出境: 26周 65. 出境: 26周 66. 出境: 26周 67. 出境: 26周 68. 出境: 26周 69. 出境: 26周 70. 出境: 26周 71. 出境: 26周 72. 出境: 26周 73. 出境: 26周 74. 出境: 26周 75. 出境: 26周 76. 出境: 26周 77. 出境: 26周 78. 出境: 26周 79. 出境: 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The first (redacted) page of the Karakash List, 蕭雨 for VOA.

The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP)

The centrepiece of the East Turkistan surveillance system is the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP). IJOP is a mobile telephone application and centralized data platform that aggregates biometric, behavioural, relational, and locational data on every resident of the region. Human Rights Watch obtained and analysed the IJOP source code in 2019, finding that the system flags individuals for investigation on the basis of criteria including: making international telephone calls; installing VPN software; avoiding the front door of one's home; and having a relative who has previously been detained.¹³

For every resident of East Turkistan, the system holds: name, national identification number, ethnicity, religion, and home address; biometric data including facial photograph, fingerprints, iris scan, voice sample, and DNA profile; all telephone and internet communications; a complete record of interactions with police, courts, and government agencies; family relationships and social networks; travel history; employment record; and financial transactions.¹⁴

Physical Surveillance Infrastructure

"Convenience police stations" are positioned approximately every 500 metres in urban areas, equipped with facial recognition cameras, QR code readers, and identity verification systems. Multiple testimonies confirm that checkpoints target those who appear Uyghur, while Han Chinese residents are waved through.¹⁵

¹³ China's Algorithms of Repression, Human Rights Watch, available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>

¹⁴ China's Algorithms of Repression, Human Rights Watch, available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>

¹⁵ China's Algorithms of Repression, Human Rights Watch, available at <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass>

Facial recognition cameras are positioned at all major intersections, public spaces, mosques, bazaars, and residential entrances. These are equipped with ethnicity-detection algorithms that generate alerts when Uyghur individuals are identified in designated locations. Chinese technology companies Dahua and Hikvision, both blacklisted by the United States government, manufactured and installed much of this equipment.¹⁶

Since 2016, authorities have conducted mass DNA collection from all residents of East Turkistan between the ages of twelve and sixty-five, building one of the world's largest ethnically targeted genetic databases.¹⁷ "Homestay" programmes periodically deploy Han Chinese officials to live with Uyghur families, ostensibly for dialogue but functioning in practice as surveillance missions.¹⁸



Screenshot from ABC News Australia's investigation, "Exposing China's Digital Dystopian Dictatorship" (2018)

The visible architecture of surveillance, including the checkpoints, the convenience police stations, the camera networks, have been partially scaled back in appearance since 2021. This is a deliberate adjustment designed to project normalcy to international observers. Its place is taken by a more pervasive system of informal surveillance. Uyghur children in state boarding schools are encouraged to report on the religious practice and political conversations of their parents during home visits. Neighbours, colleagues, and workplace supervisors are formally enrolled as informants through community monitoring programmes.¹⁹ Smartphones have become a primary instrument of monitoring: residents are required to install state-approved

¹⁶ Hikvision Cameras Used to Catch Uyghurs Featured in Xinjiang Police Files, IPVM, available at <https://ipvm.com/reports/xinjiang-police-files>

¹⁷ China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions, Human Rights Watch, available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions>

¹⁸ China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region, Human Rights Watch, available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region>

¹⁹ The Xeuliang Project: Expansion of China's State Surveillance Programme, Grey Dynamics, available at <https://greydynamics.com/the-xeuliang-project-expansion-of-chinas-state-surveillance-programme/>



applications that scan device content, and the mandatory use of WeChat for everyday transactions, including payments, communications, travel bookings.²⁰ This means that the digital record of daily life is continuously available to authorities. The effect is that removal of the visible physical infrastructure has not reduced surveillance coverage. It has made surveillance invisible, ambient, and socially embedded in ways that are considerably harder to document and escape.

Digital Surveillance of the Diaspora

China's surveillance of Uyghurs extends beyond its borders to diaspora communities worldwide. The Oxus Society's dataset documents Chinese government surveillance, hacking, and intimidation targeting Uyghurs across 22 countries. A survey of Uyghur diaspora members found that 95.8 percent reported feeling threatened by Chinese surveillance and 73.5 percent reported experiencing digital harassment. In February 2026, the WUC documented a specific incident of surveillance of Uyghurs at a community event in Tokyo.²¹

C. Forced Labour

As assessed by the United States government, the UN's Special Rapporteurs, the Uyghur Tribunal, and multiple independent researchers, China operates the world's largest state-imposed system of forced labour. The programme operates through two parallel mechanisms: forced labour within and from detention facilities, and coercive "labour transfer" of ostensibly non-detained rural workers to factories across China and within East Turkistan itself.

²⁰ Xinjiang: On technology and crimes against humanity, The China Project, available at <https://thechinaproject.com/2021/12/01/xinjiang-on-technology-and-crimes-against-humanity/>

²¹ Your Family Will Suffer, UHRP & The Oxus Society, available at <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017d-07a3-df97-a9ff-bfff8do70000>



Boycott Xinjiang Genocide Products, By Themomenthasarrived2020 - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=94824323>

The Labour Transfer Programme

The official euphemism for China's forced labour programme is "poverty alleviation through labour transfer." The reality documented by researchers, investigative journalists, and through Zhang Yabo's testimony reveals a system of coercive and involuntary relocation of Uyghur workers to factories manufacturing goods for global supply chains.

"Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region's" five-year plan for 2021 to 2025 projected 13.75 million instances of labour transfers. In January 2026, five UN Special Rapporteurs confirmed that "actual numbers have reached new heights" and expressed "grave concern" about the continuation and intensification of the programme.²²

Zhang Yabo's testimony describes government convoys transporting Uyghur workers under police monitors; identity cards confiscated from workers upon arrival to prevent departure; ten-hour workdays with no right of refusal or appeal; strict prohibitions on prayer, religious expression, or unsupervised family contact; and detention of workers who attempted to leave.²³

In 2024, Chinese government data recorded 3.34 million instances of forced labour transfers, the highest figure on record. By 2025, this had reached 3.4 million deployment instances, according to the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation's analysis of official Chinese planning data. A May 2025 civil society investigation found that some Uyghur workers had

²² UN experts alarmed by reports of forced labour of Uyghur, Tibetan and other minorities across China, UN Office of The High Commissioner, Press release, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/01/un-experts-alarmed-reports-forced-labour-uyghur-tibetan-and-other-minorities>

²³ Unprecedented Whistleblower Testimony from Inside China's Police Apparatus Confirms Xinjiang Forced Labor Is Intensifying, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, available at <https://victimsofcommunism.org/unprecedented-whistleblower-testimony-from-inside-chinas-police-apparatus-confirms-xinjiang-forced-labor-is-intensifying/>

been relocated more than 2,000 miles from East Turkistan to factories in eastern China with no right of refusal and under continuous surveillance.²⁴

The Global Supply Chain Dimension

East Turkistan is the source of approximately 25 percent of the world's cotton and over 40 percent of its polysilicon, a critical material for solar panels. China is also a dominant global supplier of aluminium, critical minerals, electric vehicle components, and textiles. Research by the Sheffield Hallam University Centre for Business and Human Rights, ASPI, and others have traced these materials through complex multi-tier supply chains to products sold by major Western retailers and manufacturers.

In June 2025, Global Rights Compliance identified 68 international corporations, including companies whose brands appear in ordinary consumer products, with supply chain exposure to Uyghur forced labour in critical minerals including titanium, lithium, beryllium, and magnesium.²⁵ In April 2026, The New York Times published an investigation linking the Labubu toy brand manufactured by Pop Mart to Uyghur forced cotton labour.²⁶

The reach of forced labour into global supply chains extends well beyond the sectors most commonly discussed in policy debates. Research compiled by the Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region documents Uyghur forced labour across a significantly broader range of industries, including tomato processing, marigold and paprika cultivation, chicken processing, footwear manufacturing, and fishing and seafood processing. A December 2024 BBC investigation found that tomato purees sold in British supermarkets under Italian branding likely contained Chinese forced-labour tomatoes sourced from East Turkistan. Another 2023 New Yorker investigation documented Uyghurs being compelled to process fish destined for global food supply chains. The full body of sector-specific research represents the most comprehensive publicly available evidence based on the industrial scope of the forced labour programme.²⁷

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and Its Enforcement

The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), signed into US law in December 2021 and into force since June 2022, establishes a rebuttable presumption that all goods mined, produced, or manufactured in the “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” are produced with forced labour and therefore prohibited from being imported into the United States. Enforcement data shows that over \$3.17 billion in shipments have been detained under the

²⁴ Uyghur workers recruited through state-imposed forced transfer programme, finds investigation; incl. cos. comments & cos. non-response, Business and Human Rights Centre, available at <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/china-over-100-global-brands-linked-to-factories-using-uyghur-workers-recruited-through-state-imposed-forced-transfer-programme-finds-investigation-incl-cos-comments-cos-non-response/>

²⁵ Risk at the Source: Critical Mineral Supply Chains and State-Imposed Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region – New Report, Global Rights Compliance, available at <https://globalrightscappliance.org/cm/>

²⁶ Some Labubu dolls contain banned cotton from Chinese region known for forced labor: investigation, New York Post, available at <https://nypost.com/2026/04/24/business/some-labubu-dolls-contain-banned-cotton-from-chinese-region-known-for-forced-labor-investigation/>

²⁷ Reports, Coalition to End Uyghur Forced Labour, available at <https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/home/reports/>

UFLPA since its implementation. The UFLPA Entity List grew to 144 entities as of January 2025.²⁸

A 2025 RAND Corporation study found that while direct imports from East Turkistan dropped significantly following UFLPA enforcement, US companies continued to have considerable exposure to “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region”-tied firms in the second, third, and fourth tiers of their supply chains.²⁹

D. Religious Persecution

Islam is, for the Uyghur people, inseparable from culture, identity, family life, and history. The great mosques of Kashgar, Hotan, and Turfan are not merely places of worship, but also repositories of architectural heritage, communal memory, and spiritual identity anchoring Uyghur communities for centuries. The Chinese state's systematic campaign against Islamic practice therefore constitutes an attack on the entire fabric of Uyghur civilisation.

Internal party documents have describes Islam as a "contagious illness" and an "ideological virus" requiring treatment. Chinese officials have explicitly described the camps as "hospitals" treating this "illness."³⁰

The Destruction of Mosques

China has acknowledged the destruction or forced alteration of approximately 16,000 mosques, representing approximately 65 percent of all mosques in the region. Modifications imposed include the removal of domes and minarets, replaced with Chinese-style architectural elements; the elimination of Arabic-script inscriptions; and the installation of surveillance cameras inside mosques. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's satellite imagery analysis found that the pace of demolition accelerated dramatically after 2017.³¹

"If one were to remove these shrines, the Uyghur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history."

Rahile Dawut, Uyghur scholar and folklorist, prior to her enforced disappearance and life imprisonment in 2017

²⁸ Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act Statistics, US Customs and Border Protection, available at <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/trade/uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-statistics>

²⁹ Combating Forced Labor in Global Supply Chains, RAND Corporation, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2534-2.html

³⁰ “Eradicating Ideological Viruses” China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web.pdf

³¹ Cultural Erasure, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, available at <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure/>



Ruins of a demolished Uyghur home in the Old Town of Kashgar, Xinjiang (via Flickr)

Criminalisation of Religious Practice

The Uyghur Human Rights Project has documented 1,046 cases of imams and religious figures detained since 2014. Of reviewed cases, 96 percent received sentences of at least five years; fourteen received life sentences. Individuals were sentenced for offences including "teaching children to pray," "organising illegal religious activities," and possessing an "unauthorised" copy of the Quran.³²

Among the religious practices explicitly prohibited or criminalised under the De-extremification Regulations and related instruments: praying outside permitted times and locations; fasting during Ramadan; wearing the hijab, niqab, or face veil in public; men keeping beards deemed "abnormal"; giving children names with Islamic connotations; possessing unapproved religious texts; officiating or attending unauthorised religious ceremonies; sending children to private Quran lessons; refusing to watch state television; and making pilgrimage to Mecca without official permission.³³

The February 2024 Religious Regulations make the "Sinicisation" of religion in East Turkistan a formal legal requirement. All religious practice must "adhere to the direction of Sinicisation"; mosque architecture must "reflect Chinese characteristics"; and religious education must incorporate "patriotic education," a euphemism for CCP political indoctrination.³⁴


Persecution of Scholars and Intellectuals

³² Islam Dispossessed: China's Persecution of Uyghur Imams and Religious Figures, Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at <https://uhrp.org/report/islam-dispossessed-chinas-persecution-of-uyghur-imams-and-religious-figures/>

³³ Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification, China Law Translate, available at <https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-regulation-on-de-extremification/>

³⁴ Country policy and information note: Muslims (including Uyghurs in Xinjiang), July 2025 (accessible), gov.uk, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-muslims-including-uyghurs-in-xinjiang-july-2022-accessible>

Among those detained are some of the most distinguished Uyghur scholars, artists, and cultural figures. Rahile Dawut, founder of the Xinjiang Folklore Research Centre and internationally recognised expert on Uyghur oral tradition, disappeared in December 2017 and is believed to be serving a life sentence. Economist Ilham Tohti, recipient of the Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders, 2016 and the Sakharov Prize, 2019 had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 2014 on charges of "separatism." Ekpar Asat, an entrepreneur who participated in a US State Department Leadership programme in 2016, was taken from a flight upon his return and was sentenced to a fifteen-year sentence.



Map of the Xinjiang Internment Camps created by the RAND Corporation based on data collected by the US National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

E. Cultural Genocide, Erasure of Uyghur Identity, and Sinicisation

Scholars of genocide have long recognised that the erasure of culture is both a feature of genocidal processes and a form of harm that inflicts profound and lasting damage on communities even without mass killings. In the Uyghur case, cultural destruction operates alongside and in support of the physical and demographic dimensions of the genocide. By erasing language, history, and sacred memory, the Chinese state seeks to make future Uyghur resistance impossible and Uyghur identity itself unintelligible to coming generations.

The Destruction of the Uyghur Language

Beginning in 2017, Uyghur-medium education at the primary school level was systematically eliminated and replaced with Mandarin-medium instruction. By 2021, the Ministry of

Education had mandated Mandarin-based instruction in preschools throughout China, including in East Turkistan.³⁵

The Ethnic Unity Law of 2026 has formalised this policy at the highest legislative level, requiring Mandarin as the primary language of instruction in all schools and prohibiting minority languages as the primary medium of core subject teaching.³⁶ Immediately following the law's passage in March 2026, Uyghur-language signage began disappearing from public spaces, including airports in Hotan.³⁷

The Demolition of the Cultural Landscape

Traditional Uyghur architecture, characterised by courtyard houses, arched bazaars, decorated minaret towers, and elaborately carved wooden doorways is being systematically demolished and replaced with generic Han Chinese commercial and residential architecture. Entire historic quarters of cities including Kashgar, Yarkand, and Hotan have been levelled, with only token remnants preserved as "minority tourism" attractions for Han Chinese visitors.

Uyghur names for cities, towns, villages, and geographic features are being replaced with Mandarin names. Villages named for saints and scholars buried in local shrines are renamed after administrative codes or Mandarin terms with no cultural resonance.

Sinicisation of the Physical Landscape

Hundreds of thousands of Han Chinese have been relocated to East Turkistan under state incentive programmes, fundamentally altering the ethnic composition of cities and previously predominantly Uyghur areas.³⁸ Cotton farms, mineral extraction facilities, and industrial parks have been established on land taken from Uyghur families, often without compensation. Remaining elements of Uyghur architecture are preserved as tourist attractions, divorced from their living cultural context.

The Propaganda of Performed Normalcy

The Chinese state has deployed an extensive propaganda apparatus to project an image of Uyghur cultural vitality to both domestic and international audiences. This includes state-produced video campaigns celebrating "ethnic unity"; state musical productions presenting sanitised versions of Uyghur culture that avoid Islamic or politically sensitive content; and organised travel to East Turkistan for international visitors following carefully curated itineraries that avoid any exposure to the detention infrastructure.

³⁵ Educational Reforms Aim to Mold Model Citizens from Preschool in the PRC, The Jamestown Foundation, available at <https://jamestown.org/educational-reforms-aim-to-mold-model-citizens-from-preschool-in-the-prc/>

³⁶ China approves 'ethnic unity' law requiring minorities to learn Mandarin, BBC, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp9meeek0510>

³⁷ China's "Ethnic Unity Law" Begins with Removal of Uyghur from Hotan Airport Sign, Uyghur Times, available at <https://uyghurtimes.com/chinas-ethnic-unity-law-begins-with-removal-of-uyghur-from-hotan-airport-sign/>

³⁸ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s Policies in Xinjiang: Overall Strategy, Central Government Involvement, and Evidence for a Systematic Attack on a Civilian Population as well as Genocide, Dr. Adrian Zenz, Select Committee Written Testimony, March 22, 2023, available at <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/adrian-zenz-testimony.pdf>

The UHRP's April 2025 briefing "Genocide Tours" documents the involvement of five international hotel chains: Accor, Hilton, IHG, Marriott, and Wyndham, in providing accommodation for such visits.³⁹

F. The Forcible Transfer of Children

Article II(e) of the 1948 Genocide Convention defines as an act of genocide the "forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." To this day, the separation of Uyghur children from their families and their placement in state-run boarding schools and orphanages continues on a vast scale, with no accountability.



An entrance to a school in Turpan, Xinjiang, China. The sign on the entrance says "Entrance to the school grounds. Please speak 'Guoyu' (national language, i.e. Mandarin Chinese)" Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

Scale and Operation of the Boarding School System

An estimated 880,500 Uyghur children are currently held in state-run boarding schools and orphanages.⁴⁰

The primary driver of family separation has been the mass detention of parents. When one or both parents were detained, children were removed from the care of extended family members and placed in state institutions. Radio Free Asia confirmed in January 2025 that at least six orphanage-style boarding schools were operational in Yarkand County, Kuchar Township, and

³⁹ It Does Matter Where You Stay: International Hotel Chains in East Turkistan, Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at <https://uhrp.org/report/it-does-matter-where-you-stay-international-hotel-chains-in-east-turkistan/>

⁴⁰ Parent-Child Separation in Yarkand County, Kashgar, Adrian Zenz, available at <https://adrianzenz.medium.com/story-45d07b25bcad>

Keriye County, directly contradicting China's claim that the detention system had been wound down.⁴¹

In February 2026, the Center for Uyghur Studies published the report "Breaking the Roots: China's Use of Boarding Schools as a Tool of Genocide Against Uyghur Muslims." The report documents: children as young as primary school age placed in state facilities; the Uyghur language prohibited within schools; familial ties explicitly demonised in the curriculum; loyalty to the CCP indoctrinated through daily instruction; parents denied all contact in many documented cases; and brutal punishment deployed to enforce compliance.⁴²

"What is happening to Uyghur children in these so-called 'boarding schools' is not education. It is forced assimilation, cultural erasure, and psychological trauma. By severing children from their families, language, and identity, the Chinese government is committing a grave injustice that meets the definition of genocide."

Abdulahakim Idris, Executive Director, Center for Uyghur Studies, February 2026

In June 2025, UN experts published a report warning of an "exponential increase" in boarding schools for minority children in China with the warning that the scale and nature of the programme could lead to permanent assimilation.⁴³ The Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2025 is the first US legislation to explicitly list "forced separation of children from their parents to be placed in boarding schools" as a sanctionable act. However, no current law in any jurisdiction mandates the return of these children, the restoration of family contact, or accountability of the specific officials responsible.

G. Forced Contraception, Sterilisation, and Demographic Warfare

The deliberate imposition of measures intended to prevent births within a group is, under Article II(d) of the Genocide Convention, an act of genocide. It is also, uniquely among the genocidal acts documented in this report, corroborated by the Chinese government's own statistical data, which reveals a collapse in Uyghur birth rates so dramatic as to be inexplicable without systemic state intervention.

The Statistical Evidence

Chinese government statistics show that birth rates in the predominantly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by over 60 percent between 2015 and 2018, at a time when the national birth rate declined by only 9.7 percent. In some counties, the collapse exceeded 80 percent. In 2015, Hotan Prefecture recorded a birth rate of 21.4 per thousand. By 2018, that figure had fallen to 8.58 per thousand. This rate of decline has no precedent in Chinese demographic

⁴¹ China expands orphanage-style boarding schools for Uyghur children, Radio Free Asia, available at <https://www.rfa.org/english/uyghur/2025/01/16/children-boarding-schools/>

⁴² China's Use of Boarding Schools as a Tool of Genocide Against Uyghur Muslims, Center for Uyghur Studies, available at <https://uyghurstudy.org/new-report-chinas-use-of-boarding-schools-as-a-tool-of-genocide-against-uyghur-muslims/>

⁴³ Letter from United Nations Special Rapporteurs, Document ref: Ref.: OL CHN 5/2026 dated 16 April 2026, available here <https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30922>

history and no plausible non-coercive explanation. Birth rates in East Turkistan fell a further 24 percent in 2019 alone, compared to a nationwide decrease of only 4.2 percent.⁴⁴

The Mechanisms of Demographic Coercion

Official Chinese government data shows that by 2019, “Xinjiang” authorities planned to subject at least 80 percent of women of childbearing age in the rural southern four minority prefectures to IUDs or sterilizations. In 2018, “Xinjiang” authorities performed 963 net added IUD placements per 100,000 of the population, far higher than the national average of 21.5.⁴⁵ Survivors have described being forcibly fitted with IUDs during post-natal check-ups or while detained in the camps. Survivors have also described being forcibly sterilised while in detention or immediately upon release from the camps, and being subjected to forced abortion, often at advanced stages of pregnancy.

Uyghur families were threatened with confiscation of assets, dismissal from employment, and detention for having children above the permitted number. Given that Uyghur families traditionally had three or four children, the sudden imposition of birth limits constituted a deliberate demographic intervention.⁴⁶

Coerced Inter-ethnic Marriage

The Chinese state has implemented incentivised programmes of inter-ethnic marriage, facilitating the pairing of Uyghur women with Han Chinese men. State-affiliated companies and local governments offer financial incentives reported at between 5,000 and 10,000 RMB per couple for Han-Uyghur marriages. Zhang Yabo confirmed the existence of these programmes from personal observation.⁴⁷ Survivors describe being approached under false pretences or being informed by local authorities that marriage with a Han Chinese man would improve their family's security situation.

H. Organ Harvesting: A Serious and Growing Allegation

The allegation that Uyghur detainees have been subjected to forced organ harvesting is among the most disturbing dimensions of the persecution. It is also, as the evidence has developed, an allegation that is increasingly difficult to dismiss.

UN and Expert Concern

In June 2021, twelve UN Special Procedures mandate holders addressed a communication to the Chinese government stating that they were “extremely alarmed” by reports of organ harvesting targeting minorities, including Uyghurs, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and Christians in detention. The experts stated they had received “credible information that

⁴⁴ Family De-planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-rates in Xinjiang, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, available at <https://www.aspi.org.au/report/family-deplanning-birthrates-xinjiang/>

⁴⁵ Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP's Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang, The Jamestown Institute, available at <https://jamestown.org/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/>

⁴⁶ Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP's Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang, The Jamestown Institute, available at <https://jamestown.org/sterilizations-iuds-and-mandatory-birth-control-the-ccps-campaign-to-suppress-uyghur-birth-rates-in-xinjiang/>

⁴⁷ Xinjiang Police Officer Zhang Yabo Defects to Germany, Alleges Abuses Inside Detention System, Turkistan Times, available at <https://turkistantimes.com/en/news-20559.html>

detainees from ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities may be forcibly subjected to blood tests and organ examinations without their informed consent, while other prisoners are not required to undergo such examinations."⁴⁸ This selective testing of ethnic groups, and not of the general prison population, is consistent with targeted organ sourcing.

The Congressional Evidence

At a March 2024 hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, expert witnesses provided detailed testimony. Ethan Gutmann of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation testified that eyewitnesses described the proximity of large re-education camps to the Aksu Infection Hospital and a crematorium, linked by an "Airport Human Organ Transport Channel," and that a hospital designated as a partner institution reported liver transplants increasing by 90 percent and kidney transplants by 200 percent in 2017, the precise year of the mass internment campaign's peak.⁴⁹

Dr. Maya Mitalipova of the MIT Whitehead Institute testified that the Chinese government has invested billions of dollars in DNA sequencing of entire populations in East Turkistan and Tibet, and that Thermo Fisher Scientific continued to sell HLA kits and DNA profiling products for organ transplantation in China at a scale of ten million units. Matthew Robertson of the Australian National University testified that analysis of hacked Xinjiang police files revealed that more than 200,000 of approximately 500,000 Uyghurs registered in two regions had blood samples taken for DNA collection up until 2018.⁵⁰



The Xinjiang Police Files website

⁴⁸ China: UN human rights experts alarmed by 'organ harvesting' allegations, UN Office of The High Commissioner, available at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/06/china-un-human-rights-experts-alarmed-organ-harvesting-allegations?LangID=E&NewsID=27167>

⁴⁹ Ethan Gutmann Congressional-Executive Commission on China "Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting," available at <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/documents/Gutmann%20Testimony%20-%20March%2020202024.pdf>

⁵⁰ Forced organ Harvesting and corporate complicity in China, Testimony of Maya (Maisam) Mitalipova, available at <https://www.cecc.gov/sites/evo-subsites/cecc.house.gov/files/documents/Maya%20Mitalipova%20--%20Corporate%20complicity%20in%20Forced%20Organ%20Harvesting%20in%20China.pdf>

The East Turkistan Transplant Expansion

In December 2024, the Xinjiang Health Commission announced plans to open six additional organ transplant medical institutions in the region by 2030, bringing the total to nine. East Turkistan's official organ donation rate is 0.69 per million people, significantly below the national average of 4.66 per million.⁵¹ The planned expansion of transplant facilities cannot be justified by voluntary donation rates. The expansion is consistent only with a source of organs not reflected in official donation statistics.

The China Tribunal, the independent legal panel chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, found in 2019 that "forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience has been practised for a substantial period of time involving a very large number of victims," a conclusion described as proven "beyond reasonable doubt."⁵² The Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act of 2025 represents the first specific legislative recognition of the organ harvesting allegation in US law, listing "human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal" as a sanctionable act.

I. Enforced Disappearances

Enforced disappearance refers to the deprivation of liberty followed by a refusal to acknowledge detention or disclose the fate of the disappeared person. This is a crime under international human rights law and a feature of the persecution of the Uyghur people at every level. From prominent public figures to ordinary villagers, enforced disappearance has been systematically used as a tool of coercion and control.

High-Profile Cases

Notable examples include Rahile Dawut, a distinguished folklorist and founder of the Xinjiang Folklore Research Centre, who disappeared in December 2017 and is believed to be serving a life sentence for "separatism." Ilham Tohti, economist and advocate for Uyghur rights, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2014. Ekpar Asat, an entrepreneur, who was taken from a flight upon his return to China after participating in a US State Department programme and who is serving a fifteen-year sentence. Gulshan Abbas, a medical doctor, who was detained following her sister Rushan Abbas's public advocacy in the United States in September 2018, subsequently sentenced to twenty years in prison, and is held incommunicado since 2018. Other examples include Yalqun Rozi, Hushtar Isa, Yalqun Isa, Mehmetjan Abdullah, Abdubesar Shukur, Anduqadir Jalalidin, Arslan Abdullah, Gheyretjan Osman, Gulmire Imin, Halmurat Ghopur, Nurtay Haji Iskender, Perhat Tursun, Qurban Mamut, Tashpolat Tiyp, Tursunjan Hezim, Wahitjan Osman. These cases represent a fraction of the documented total.

J. Transnational Repression -- The Long Arm of the Surveillance State

The persecution of the Uyghur people does not end at China's borders. The Chinese state has constructed a systematic apparatus of coercion, surveillance, and intimidation that reaches

⁵¹ Xinjiang's Organ Transplant Expansion Sparks Alarm Over Uyghur Forced Organ Harvesting, The Diplomat, available at <https://thediplomat.com/2025/07/xinjiangs-organ-transplant-expansion-sparks-alarm-over-uyghur-forced-organ-harvesting/>

⁵² The Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, Judgment, available at https://chinatribunal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ChinaTribunal_JUDGMENT_1stMarch_2020.pdf

into diaspora communities across five continents, targeting activists, journalists, former detainees, and their family members with the explicit aim of silencing testimony and suppressing advocacy. Freedom House's 2025 transnational repression report identified China as the world's leading perpetrator of transnational repression.⁵³ The Oxus Society has documented individual incidents across as many as 22 countries via Operation Foxhunt and Operation Skynet.⁵⁴

Misuse of INTERPOL

China systematically abuses the INTERPOL Red Notice system to pursue Uyghur activists abroad. Article 3 of the INTERPOL Constitution explicitly prohibits member states from using the system against individuals for offences of a political, racial, or religious character, yet China has repeatedly secured Red Notices and informal diffusions against Uyghur activists on fabricated charges. The most prominent case is that of former WUC president Dolkun Isa, who bore an INTERPOL Red Notice for twenty-one years before it was cancelled. During this time he was denied entry to multiple countries and came close to extradition to China.⁵⁵ Idris Hasan, a Uyghur activist detained at Casablanca airport, remained in detention for over two years awaiting deportation to China even after INTERPOL cancelled the relevant notice.⁵⁶



Interpol Headquarters

Passport and Document Controls

From 2016 onwards, Uyghurs residing abroad have been systematically denied the ability to renew Chinese passports at Chinese consulates, rendering them effectively stateless. In

⁵³ Collaboration and Resistance: Tracking Transnational Repression in 2025, Freedom House, available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/FH_TransnationalRepression2026_final%20%281%29.pdf

⁵⁴ No Space Left to Run, Uyghur Human Rights project & The Oxus Society, available at https://uhrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Transnational-Repression_FINAL_2021-06-24.pdf

⁵⁵ INTERPOL deletes Red Notice against persecuted Uyghur dissident Dolkun Isa, Fair Trials, available at <https://www.fairtrials.org/articles/news/interpol-deletes-red-notice-against-persecuted-uyghur-dissident-dolkun-isa/>

⁵⁶ Morocco/Western Sahara: Further Information: Uyghur Activist Released from Moroccan Prison: Idris Hasan, Amnesty International, available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde29/9075/2025/en/>

documented cases, consular officials have confiscated existing passports from Uyghurs who attended appointments. In 2025, reports emerged of Chinese consulates deliberately issuing passports containing false information to Uyghurs abroad, creating a fabricated pretext for their deportation on the grounds of travelling on a fraudulent document.⁵⁷

The Weaponisation of Family

The most pervasive mechanism of transnational repression is the systematic exploitation of family ties. When Uyghur diaspora activists speak publicly, attend advocacy events, or meet with political figures, family members remaining in East Turkistan are threatened, interrogated, or detained. This mechanism has been documented in thousands of individual cases by the WUC, the Uyghur Human Rights Project, the Oxus Society, and other organisations. In January 2026, the WUC submitted an extensive briefing to the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances documenting how Chinese security services systematically exploit family ties to silence diaspora voices.⁵⁸

Illegal Deportations

Documented cases of illegal deportation of Uyghurs to China have occurred in Egypt, Thailand, the UAE, Turkey, Malaysia, Cambodia, and multiple Central Asian states. In February 2025, Thailand deported 40 male Uyghur asylum seekers to China in defiance of international condemnation and available offers of third-country resettlement. Thai officials confirmed that the decision was driven by fear of Chinese economic retaliation.⁵⁹ Between 1997 and December 2016, China was involved in the detention or deportation of over 851 Uyghurs across 23 countries; since 2017, at least a further 695 Uyghurs have been detained or deported from 15 countries.⁶⁰ This is not new, and has been a recurring pattern for decades.⁶¹

Digital Surveillance and Cyberattacks

Chinese government surveillance, hacking, and digital intimidation campaigns targeting Uyghurs have been documented across 22 countries. Methods deployed include monitoring of social media accounts; hacking of mobile devices and computers; deployment of commercial spyware; infiltration of diaspora WhatsApp and WeChat groups by Chinese state informants; and the use of AI-generated deepfakes and targeted disinformation campaigns against individual activists.⁶²

Clandestine Police Stations

⁵⁷ China's Passport Trap: A Covert Scheme to Force Uyghurs Home, Uyghur Times, available at <https://uyghurtimes.com/chinas-passport-trap-a-covert-scheme-to-force-uyghurs-home/>

⁵⁸ Submission to the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, World Uyghur Congress, available at <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/WUCs-UN-WGEID-CED-Submission-on-TNR.pdf>

⁵⁹ Thailand deports dozens of Uyghurs to China, BBC, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c14jxz8re6o>

⁶⁰ No Space Left to Run, Uyghur Human Rights project & The Oxus Society, available at https://uhrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Transnational-Repression_FINAL_2021-06-24.pdf

⁶¹ Seeking a place to breathe freely, World Uyghur Congress, available at <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/WUC-Refugee-Report-Updated-June-2017-1.pdf>

⁶² Nowhere feels safe, Amnesty International, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2020/02/china-uyghurs-abroad-living-in-fear/>; No Space Left to Run, Uyghur Human Rights Project & The Oxus Society, available at https://uhrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Transnational-Repression_FINAL_2021-06-24.pdf

Chinese security services have established at least 102 clandestine “Chinese Overseas Police Service Centers” in 53 countries around the world and these have been used to execute “persuasion to return” operations. These stations operate outside any bilateral law enforcement agreement and in direct violation of host-country domestic laws.⁶³ They also function as local enforcement nodes for transnational repression operations. The United States government has brought criminal prosecutions in connection to them on American soil.

Violations of International Law

China's transnational repression regime violates multiple provisions of international law. The forcible deportation of Uyghurs to China violates the non-refoulement principle enshrined in Article 3 of the UN Convention Against Torture and Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention. The confiscation of passports and denial of consular services violates Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The operation of clandestine police stations constitutes criminal activity under the domestic law of host states.

⁶³ Patrol and Persuade, Safeguard Defenders, available at <https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/Patrol%20and%20Persuade%20v2.pdf>

SECTION 3: THE REENGINEERING OF REPRESSION: THREE PHASES OF DELIBERATE ADAPTATION

One of the most sophisticated aspects of China's management of the Uyghur persecution is its deliberate adaptation of the genocide in response to international scrutiny. What began as a programme of visible, confrontational mass internment has been progressively redesigned to be less visible and more defensible in international forums. This is being done without in any way reducing the underlying intent or the scale of harm inflicted on the Uyghur people. The system has evolved through three distinct phases.

The first phase (2016 to 2019)

This phase was characterised by the unapologetic, high-speed construction of a mass detention infrastructure under Chen Quanguo. The pace of camp construction was so rapid, and so visible from commercial satellite imagery, that denial quickly became untenable. China's initial response was predictable: denial that the camps existed, then denial that they were detention facilities, then rebranding them as "vocational education and training centres" offering voluntary courses in Chinese language, law, and de-extremification.

The China Cables demonstrated through the classified Telegram that this reclassification was a deliberate communications strategy. Under mounting international pressure, China announced in late 2019 that the camps had been "closed" and all detainees had "graduated." This claim was strategically designed to provide political cover for international actors, particularly in Europe and among Muslim-majority states, who sought a justification for not escalating their response.

The claim was false. Zhang Yabo's testimony confirms that the detention continued and only its institutional location was changed: detainees were transferred from the extrajudicial camp system to the formal criminal justice system. The infrastructure was preserved. The populations were transferred. The files were explicitly ordered to be destroyed, to prevent detection.

The second phase (2021-2025)

This phase onwards, the appointment of Ma Xingrui as "Xinjiang" party secretary brought a new aesthetic of repression. Where Chen Quanguo had operated with brutal openness, Ma's methods operated underground. Zhang Yabo's testimony reveals in extraordinary detail that the most conspicuous elements of mass internment were dialled back in visibility while the underlying architecture remained fully intact. Short-term detention campaigns continued, accompanied by strict orders to destroy all documentation. The systematic concealment of operational details from outside observers became standard practice.

Internationally, this transition was sometimes misread as reform even though the genocide continued. This included detention, transfer of Uyghur children, forced labour, and the Sinicisation and cultural genocide.

The third phase (2025 onwards)

The culmination of this entire trajectory is the Ethnic Unity Law of 2026: repression enshrined in legislation. This converted what had been implemented through administrative decree and coercive campaign into a permanent, nationwide legal requirement.

The law does not represent a new phase of persecution so much as its final form. What required Chen Quanguo's machinery of violence and Ma Xingrui's machinery of concealment now requires neither, because it has been written into law. The genocide continues across every dimension documented in the preceding section. The methods have changed, even as the intent continues. And the question that ten years of documentation, advocacy, litigation, and legislation has not yet answered is whether the international community possesses the political will to stop it.

SECTION 4: WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE - GAPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In spite of the achievements documented above, the work remains unfinished. The genocide continues. The children remain separated. The incarcerated remain imprisoned. The surveillance apparatus remains operational. The forced labour remains embedded in global supply chains. What follows is an account of where the response has fallen short, paired with specific recommendations.

I. Mass Detention, the Carceral Pipeline, and the Children's Crisis

Naming forced family separation as a sanctionable act is a step in the right direction, but more needs to be done to reverse it. No legislation in any jurisdiction currently mandates the return of separated children to their families, the restoration of family contact, or the prosecution of the specific officials who designed and implemented the boarding school programme. No legislation mandates the release of those detained under fabricated charges or the accountability of officials responsible for the carceral pipeline. Each year of inaction makes reintegration harder and the carceral system more entrenched.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Pass legislation mandating accountability for the forced separation of Uyghur children, including measures requiring China to restore family contact and the individual sanctioning of officials responsible for the boarding school programme.
- Raise the forced separation of children as a specific genocide indicator in all bilateral diplomatic engagement with China, and pursue state responsibility at international courts and forums.
- Sanction additional officials under the Global Magnitsky Act and equivalent mechanisms, with particular focus on those responsible for the boarding school programme and the Ethnic Unity Law's implementation.
- Call on China to provide a full accounting of all individuals held in the formal prison system following transfer from extrajudicial detention, and to grant independent monitoring access to detention facilities.
- Call on China to establish contact of all individuals held in detention with their families and to allow for regular visits.

For civil society:

- Develop dedicated advocacy strategies focused specifically on the boarding school system, the dimension of the genocide with the greatest gap between the scale of harm and the adequacy of response.
- Continue and expand documentation of the boarding school system and carceral pipeline with particular urgency, given standing Chinese authority orders to destroy records of detention and transfer operations.

For academics and journalists:

- Research the lived impact of the boarding school system in individual communities, including through testimony from Uyghurs with recent direct knowledge.

- Support Uyghur-language preservation and oral history documentation initiatives. The loss of language fluency among the younger generation is accelerating and will become irreversible without urgent intervention.

II. The Surveillance State

The United States has placed Hikvision, Dahua, Megvii, SenseTime, and other key surveillance technology companies on the Entity List, restricting US exports to these firms. DJI has been designated on the Pentagon's list of Chinese military companies. These are significant steps. However, enforcement and implementation remain incomplete. Hikvision and Dahua equipment continues to operate in European public infrastructure, government buildings, and schools, as no equivalent EU-wide prohibition exists. US federal agencies were found to still be operating blacklisted equipment years after restrictions came into force. The UK took steps to remove Hikvision equipment from sensitive government sites following a 2022 parliamentary vote but has enacted no comprehensive legislative ban. No sanctions have been imposed specifically for the construction or operation of the IJOP system or the mass DNA database. The companies that built this infrastructure have faced trade restrictions in some jurisdictions. They have not faced legal accountability for the role that infrastructure plays in the persecution of the Uyghur people.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Enact EU-wide legislation prohibiting the procurement, installation, and continued operation of surveillance equipment from Entity List-designated Chinese manufacturers in all public, government, and critical infrastructure contexts, closing the gap that US and UK restrictions have not yet addressed in European markets.
- Audit and enforce existing restrictions: require all federal, state, and local government entities in the United States to confirm full removal of blacklisted surveillance equipment and establish binding timelines for compliance where equipment remains in place.
- Expand sanctions specifically targeting officials and entities responsible for the design, procurement, and operation of the IJOP system and the mass DNA database, distinct from broader trade restrictions.

For businesses and supply chain actors:

- Refrain from procuring or installing surveillance equipment from Dahua, Hikvision, DJI, or other blacklisted Chinese surveillance technology companies directly complicit in the surveillance infrastructure targeting Uyghurs.
- Conduct audits of existing technology infrastructure to identify and replace equipment from Hikvision, Dahua, DJI, and other designated companies, going beyond minimum legal compliance to reflect the documented role of this equipment in the persecution of the Uyghur people.

For academics and journalists:

- Continue investigative research into the global export of East Turkistan-style surveillance technology to other authoritarian governments, the corporations facilitating this transfer, and the compliance failures of governments that have enacted restrictions but not enforced them.

III. Forced Labour and Supply Chain Accountability

The UFLPA and the EU Forced Labour Regulation exist but are not working at the depth required. A 2025 RAND Corporation study found that US companies retain substantial Tier 3 and Tier 4 supply chain exposure to East Turkistan-tied firms even after UFLPA implementation. The EU Regulation's failure to classify all East Turkistan-origin goods as high-risk creates a regulatory gap that industry has proven adept at exploiting. Forced labour goods continue to reach the world's largest markets.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Amend the EU Forced Labour Regulation to classify all East Turkistan-origin goods as high-risk, mirroring the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption rather than permitting case-by-case determinations that industry has demonstrated it can delay indefinitely.
- Introduce similar legislation to the UFLPA with the presence of a reversed burden of proof for products from East Turkistan in Switzerland, Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway, as well as other jurisdictions currently without forced labour regulations..
- Issue sanctions on companies and individuals under the Global Magnitsky Act and equivalent mechanisms which are involved in the use of Uyghur forced labour.
- Strengthen UFLPA enforcement resources at US Customs and Border Protection, with particular focus on deep supply chain tracing in critical minerals, solar energy, electric vehicles, and textiles.

For businesses and supply chain actors:

- Conduct full supply chain traceability to the raw material level for any goods with potential connections to Uyghur forced labour, including second, third, and fourth-tier supplier relationships.
- Develop responsible exit strategies from East Turkistan-linked sourcing, rather than superficial due diligence measures that provide legal cover without substantive reform.
- Do not operate hotels, facilitate tourism, or engage in commercial activity in East Turkistan that contributes to the normalisation agenda China's genocide tourism programme is designed to advance.
- Share best practice on forced labour due diligence across sectors and support full implementation of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive as a minimum accountability standard.

For academics and journalists:

- Continue investigative journalism on supply chain links between global consumer products and Uyghur forced labour, using the template established by the Labubu/Pop Mart investigation to make the connection legible to general audiences.

IV. Religious Persecution and Cultural Genocide

No international mechanism has specifically targeted officials responsible for the systematic destruction of mosques, the criminalisation of Islamic practice, or the erasure of Uyghur language and cultural heritage. The Ethnic Unity Law of 2026, which legally codifies the assimilation programme, has generated condemnation but no specific legal response. The cultural and linguistic destruction of a people is advancing without a dedicated accountability framework.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Formally designate the Ethnic Unity Law of 2026 as a tool of cultural genocide in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic forums, and apply specific sanctions to officials responsible for its drafting and implementation.
- Sanction officials specifically responsible for the mosque destruction programme and the criminalisation of Islamic practice, distinct from existing broader "Xinjiang" sanctions.
- Support and fund international efforts to document, preserve, and protect Uyghur cultural heritage, including architectural, oral, and written traditions at risk of permanent destruction.

For academics and journalists:

- Research the implementation and lived impact of the Ethnic Unity Law in real communities, including through testimony from Uyghurs with recent and direct knowledge.
- Support Uyghur-language preservation and oral history documentation initiatives as a matter of urgency.

V. Enforced Disappearances

Hundreds of documented cases of enforced disappearance of prominent Uyghur individuals remain unresolved. Families of the disappeared have received no formal notification of charges, proceedings, or sentences. No Chinese official has been sanctioned specifically for the crime of enforced disappearance.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Apply individual targeted sanctions under Global Magnitsky Act mechanisms to officials responsible for specific documented cases of enforced disappearance.
- Raise the cases of Dr. Rahile Dawut, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, Hushtar and Yalkun Isa, Ekpar Asat, Ilham Tohti, the 40 Uyghurs deported from Thailand and other documented disappeared individuals by name in all bilateral diplomatic engagements with China.
- Support the work of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in relation to East Turkistan, including through the formal submission of documented cases.

For civil society:

- Continue systematic documentation and public communication of enforced disappearance cases, maintaining the visibility of individual named victims within broader advocacy campaigns.

VI. The UN Accountability Gap

The UN has the authority to act on "Xinjiang" but has not, due to structural obstacles. China's permanent Security Council seat closes that avenue before it opens. In 2022, a motion simply to debate the OHCHR's own findings on "Xinjiang" was voted down 19 to 17. China lost the argument on evidence but won the vote through economic leverage over dependent states. The 2022 OHCHR report has never been followed up, despite the Ethnic Unity Law, the boarding school expansion, and Zhang Yabo's verified insider testimony all postdating it.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Press the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to commission a formal follow-up report reflecting all developments since 2022. Make clear that institutional silence in the face of new evidence is itself a political choice.
- Ensure that genocide recognition translates into concrete bilateral policy changes, including trade conditions, investment screening, and diplomatic consequences, not merely into the language of resolutions.
- Invest in accountability mechanisms that bypass the Security Council. The International Court of Justice, UN General Assembly, Universal Jurisdiction in different States and UN Treaty Bodies can hear complaints under the Genocide Convention without a Security Council referral. Identifying and supporting an applicant state to bring such a case should be an active diplomatic priority.

For civil society:

- Build formal coalitions with Tibetan, Inner Mongolian, and Hong Kong advocacy organisations. The repression operates through the same apparatus. A coordinated case is harder to dismiss than parallel campaigns.

VII. Transnational Repression

The February 2025 deportations from Thailand demonstrated that Chinese economic leverage over developing states is sufficient in practice to override non-refoulement obligations and UNHCR guidance. Loopholes remain in the INTERPOL system. Clandestine Chinese police stations continue to operate in Western countries. The fabricated passport scheme documented in 2025 (whereby the Chinese government deliberately issued passports with false information to Uyghurs abroad) represents a new escalation that has received no specific legal response.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Apply sustained diplomatic pressure on Egypt, Thailand, Turkey, Malaysia, and the UAE to halt all deportations of Uyghurs to China, including targeted visa restrictions on officials individually responsible for such deportations.
- Reform INTERPOL governance to prevent systematic misuse of Red Notices as a tool of political persecution, including mandatory screening of notices from states with documented repression histories and enhanced independence for the Notices and Diffusion Task Force.
- Enact specific legislation addressing the fabricated passport scheme, including criminal penalties for foreign state agents who create or exploit fraudulent documentation to manufacture deportation pretexts.
- Prosecute the operators of clandestine Chinese police stations under existing domestic criminal law, and coordinate cross-border intelligence sharing to map and disrupt this network across allied states.
- Provide specialised training for judicial, police, intelligence, and immigration and asylum authorities to properly respond to transnational repression in their jurisdictions. Refer to the experiences of diaspora communities to help design the training.
- Publish a yearly report with data and trends on transnational repression, highlighting the main perpetrators.

- Create a data collection system in each jurisdiction where authorities can keep track of all criminal and non-criminal transnational repression cases. Consider legislating transnational repression as its own serious criminal offense.

For civil society:

- Support and actively protect whistleblowers such as Zhang Yabo, ensuring testimony is legally authenticated, securely preserved, and made available to all relevant judicial and quasi-judicial institutions.

For Uyghurs in the diaspora:

- Know your rights regarding digital surveillance and transnational repression in your country of residence. If you are experiencing harassment, coercion, or contact from individuals claiming to represent Chinese authorities, seek legal advice immediately.
- Use secure communications tools such as Signal and encrypted email for all sensitive communications. Assume standard channels, including WeChat, are monitored.
- Document and report all incidents of harassment, surveillance, or coercion to your national authorities and to the WUC. Documentation is the foundation of legal action and policy change.
- Access legal support for family separation and enforced disappearance cases through the WUC and partner organisations.
- Continue bearing witness. The testimony of survivors and diaspora members has been the single most important driver of international awareness of the Uyghur crisis. Each voice that speaks is essential to the record and to the prospect of justice.

VIII. Organ Harvesting

No independent international investigation has been authorised, despite serious, multi-sourced evidence corroborated by statistical analysis, expert testimony, and official Chinese health data, into the organ harvesting allegations. The December 2024 announcement of six new transplant facilities planned for East Turkistan by 2030 is alarming. The international medical community has the technical capacity to assess this. It must do so immediately.

For policymakers and parliamentarians:

- Press for a formal, fully independent investigation at the UN level, with technical support from the WHO and relevant transplantation medicine institutions, and with powers to compel disclosure of Chinese hospital and transplant registry data.
- Legislate to prohibit medical professionals and institutions under national jurisdiction from participating in organ transplant tourism to China until independent verification is possible.

For academics and journalists:

- Investigate the organ harvesting allegations rigorously, applying the standards of forensic medical investigation to the available evidence and publishing findings in peer-reviewed medical journals where they carry the greatest institutional weight.

SECTION 5: CONCLUSION

The evidence assembled in this report is consistent and corroborated. It spans ten categories of crime, seven categories of primary evidence, and a decade of continuous documentation, drawn from sources that are independently verifiable and mutually reinforcing.

The international response to that evidence has produced genuine achievements, representing hard-won progress against a permanent Security Council member with the world's second-largest economy. However, those achievements have not stopped the genocide. The forced labour programme reached its highest recorded level in 2025. The boarding school system has expanded. The Ethnic Unity Law has converted a decade of administrative repression into permanent statutory obligation. The system was not dismantled in response to international pressure. It was reengineered to survive it.

The legal frameworks required for accountability are available. The Uyghur people have testified at enormous personal cost, organised across borders under surveillance, and built the case on which any future accountability must rest.

What remains is for states, institutions, and the international community to act on what they know, with measures that are in proportion to the scale and duration of China's crimes.

ANNEXURE I: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE - WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED

Ten years of sustained advocacy by the World Uyghur Congress, allied civil society organisations, diaspora communities, academics, investigative journalists, and sympathetic governments have produced concrete legislative, legal, diplomatic, and institutional achievements. These achievements are real and must be acknowledged. The record that follows is both a foundation for further action and a testament to the power of sustained, principled advocacy.

Legislative Achievements

United States

- Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (2020): The first US legislation specifically targeting East Turkistan linked abuses. It mandated annual human rights reporting on the XUAR, required the President to identify and sanction those responsible for gross violations, and called for INTERPOL accountability mechanisms. It was extended to 2030 by the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act.
- Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (2021/2022): The most commercially consequential Uyghur-related law enacted anywhere in the world. It established a rebuttable presumption that all East Turkistan-origin goods are produced with forced labour, fundamentally altering the legal risk landscape for US importers. It has catalysed over \$3.17 billion in detained shipments since implementation across 13 priority sectors.
- Uyghur Genocide Accountability and Sanctions Act (2025): The most comprehensive US legislation to date. It expanded sanctionable conduct to include systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilisation, and involuntary contraceptive implantation; organ harvesting through human trafficking; forced separation of children into state boarding schools; and forced deportation or refoulement to China. It also directed the Secretary of State to fund atrocity documentation and survivor support.

European Union

- European Parliament Resolutions on the Uyghur Crisis (2017 to 2026): The European Parliament has adopted five resolutions specifically addressing the persecution of the Uyghur people since 2017, making it an active supranational legislative body on this issue. These resolutions have called for targeted sanctions against Chinese officials, condemned the camp system, demanded the release of named detainees, recognised the situation as a serious risk of genocide, and most recently called for the repeal of the Ethnic Unity Law of 2026 and the activation of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against officials responsible for its implementation. Taken together, they represent a sustained and escalating legislative record that has applied consistent political pressure on both the Chinese government and EU member state governments to act.
- EU Forced Labour Regulation (2024): Prohibits goods produced with forced labour from being placed on the EU market, requiring supply chain due diligence across all sectors.

- EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (2024): It established mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence requirements for large companies operating in the EU, with civil liability for failure to address supply chain risks including forced labour.
- Freeze of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Following China's retaliatory sanctions against European parliamentarians and academics in response to the March 2021 multilateral sanctions, the European Parliament voted to freeze ratification of the CAI.

Legal and Judicial Achievements

- Uyghur Tribunal Verdict (December 2021): The independent Tribunal, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the Chinese government had committed genocide against the Uyghur people through its programme of forced IUD insertion, sterilisation, and coercive contraception (Article II(d) of the Genocide Convention), and crimes against humanity including torture, rape and sexual violence, forced labour, enforced disappearance, and persecution.
- Universal Jurisdiction: Argentina (August 2023): Argentine courts accepted a complaint allowing the investigation of Chinese officials for crimes against the Uyghur people regardless of where those crimes occurred. Universal jurisdiction proceedings are also underway in other jurisdictions.
- UK Court of Appeal Victory (May 2024): The WUC and the Global Legal Action Network won a landmark ruling that the UK Government's approach to supply chain due diligence for East Turkistan-origin cotton goods was legally inadequate. Established that governments, not merely corporations, bear legal accountability for supply chain complicity in forced labour.
- France and Spain Complaint Against Technology Companies (2026): A complaint was filed against Huawei, Hikvision, and Dahua alleging complicity in the surveillance infrastructure used to persecute Uyghurs, the first legal action of its kind targeting named corporations for their role in the surveillance state.

Diplomatic and Sanctions Achievements

- Coordinated Multilateral Sanctions (March 2021): The United States, European Union, Canada, and United Kingdom imposed parallel sanctions on four senior Chinese officials: Zhu Hailun, Wang Junzheng, Wang Mingshan, and Chen Mingguo, and on the XPCC. The first coordinated four-party sanctioning action against China over "Xinjiang".
- OHCHR Report (August 2022): The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights formally acknowledged for the first time that serious human rights violations in East Turkistan may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity, produced under extraordinary diplomatic pressure from China to suppress or delay it.
- CERD Referral to the Office on Genocide Prevention (November 2022): The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination formally referred the "Xinjiang" situation to the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, the first such action by CERD in relation to China.

- 52-State Joint Statement (November 2022): Fifty-two UN member states signed a joint statement at the UN General Assembly Third Committee condemning China's violations in “Xinjiang,” the largest such coalition to date.
- Five UN Special Rapporteurs (January 2026): Five independent UN Special Rapporteurs jointly expressed grave concern over continuing forced labour in “Xinjiang” and called on China to end the practice.
- The UN Special Procedures system, comprising independent Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups, has issued a substantial and growing body of formal communications to the Chinese government specifically concerning the persecution of Uyghurs. Since 2018, these have included a landmark joint letter from 15 mandate holders in December 2022 setting out concrete legal benchmarks for reform in East Turkistan; a 2021 letter from 12 mandate holders expressing alarm at forced organ harvesting; a 2023 letter specifically addressing the forced separation of Uyghur children; and a 2026 letter from 8 mandate holders raising concerns about the Ethnic Unity Law. In parallel, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has issued at least 10 opinions finding the detention of named Uyghur individuals to be arbitrary under international law, including findings concerning Ekpar Asat, Gulshan Abbas, and Qurban Mamut. The full repository, compiled by the International Service for Human Rights, is one of the most significant bodies of formal UN expert findings on any single human rights situation in the current era.⁶⁴

Parliamentary Recognition of Genocide

The following legislative bodies have formally recognised the situation in East Turkistan as constituting genocide and/or crimes against humanity:

- Executive determinations: the US Government as a whole, through formal genocide determinations under both the Trump and Biden administrations.
- National parliaments: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Taiwan, and the Irish Senate.
- Supranational bodies: the European Parliament.

Resettlement Initiatives

Canada

- Canada’s Motion M-62, passed unanimously by the House of Commons in February 2023, commits the Canadian government to urgently resettle 10,000 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims over a two-year period. The program targets individuals who have fled to third-party countries and face the risk of detention or forced return (refoulement) to China.

⁶⁴ Repository of United Nations recommendations on human rights in China, available at <https://ishr.ch/toolbox/resources/repository-of-united-nations-recommendations-on-human-rights-china/>

ANNEXURE II: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND TIMELINE

The Uyghur People and East Turkistan

The Uyghurs are a Turkic-speaking, predominantly Muslim people indigenous to East Turkistan. Uyghur civilisation traces its roots to the Uyghur Khaganate (744 to 840 CE), a major steppe empire that at its height extended across Central Asia. Uyghur cities including Turpan, Kashgar, Hotan, and Yarkand lay on the ancient Silk Road and became renowned centres of Islamic scholarship, architecture, music, and trade.

The East Turkistan Republic

The East Turkistan Republic was established in November 1944 in the Ili Valley (Ghulja). This republic is of more than historical significance: it establishes beyond doubt that the Uyghur people have a distinct national consciousness, a history of self-governance, and a legitimate claim to political representation in their own territory. The PRC's consistent denial of this history and its criminalisation of Uyghur cultural and political identity is itself a form of the cultural genocide this report documents.

CCP Rule: 1949 to the 2000s

The People's Liberation Army entered East Turkistan in 1949. The region was incorporated into the PRC and redesignated as the "Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region" (XUAR) in 1955. The designation "autonomous" was, from the beginning, more nominal than real. Political control remained firmly in Beijing's hands, mediated through a party apparatus dominated by Han officials. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary agricultural and industrial organisation, was established to accelerate Han settlement of the region.

The 1990s and 2000s: Growing Repression

In February 1997, security forces killed an estimated 167 or more protesters in the city of Ghulja following a peaceful demonstration against restrictions on Islamic practice. The bodies of protesters were dumped in the street; mass arrests followed; and public executions were reported in subsequent weeks. The Ghulja Massacre was a pivotal moment in the intensification of state repression.

Beijing launched the "Strike Hard" campaign targeting Uyghur political and religious activity with disproportionate severity. The July 2009 Ürümqi events resulted in over 200 Uyghur deaths and 1,700 injuries. The Chinese government's response included mass arrests of Uyghur men, internet blackouts lasting months, and a security crackdown that Human Rights Watch described as "collective punishment."

2014: The Second Strike Hard Campaign

In April 2014, Xi Jinping conducted his first visit to “Xinjiang” as General Secretary and delivered a series of classified internal speeches to senior party officials. The leaked transcripts, published in 2019 as part of the “Xinjiang Papers” by The New York Times, reveal the ideological foundations of the subsequent mass persecution. Xi explicitly invoked the metaphor of an infectious disease requiring “painful, intervention treatment” and authorised an all-out offensive against Uyghur culture and religion.

The Counter-Terrorism Law of 2015 defined extremism so broadly that ordinary Islamic practices, including wearing a veil, keeping a beard, possessing a Quran, refusing to watch state television, or sending children to Quran lessons, were criminalised.

2016 to 2017: The Architecture of Mass Internment

The appointment of Chen Quanguo as Communist Party Secretary of “Xinjiang” in August 2016 was the pivotal administrative decision of the entire persecution. Under Chen, hundreds of facilities designated “Vocational Education and Training Centres” were built across the region. The Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), a mobile phone application and predictive policing system aggregating biometric, behavioural, and social data on every resident, was rolled out across the region. By the end of 2017, an estimated 3 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic minorities had been detained without charge or trial.

2018 to 2019: International Exposure and Denial

2018 was the year the outside world began to understand the scale of what was happening. The August 2018 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination review saw panel members describe a “no-rights zone” and demand answers about the “mass internment camps.” The BBC, The New York Times, and BuzzFeed News published the first major investigations.

In November 2019, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists published the “China Cables,” a leak of classified Chinese government documents governing the operation of the detention camps. The same month, The New York Times published the Xinjiang Papers. Under mounting international pressure, Chinese officials began claiming the camps had been “closed.” The evidence demonstrates that what occurred was not closure but reclassification.

2020 to 2021: Formalisation and International Sanctions

The period 2020 to 2021 saw the consolidation of two parallel systems of repression: the formalisation of mass imprisonment through the criminal justice system, and the dramatic expansion of the forced labour system. On 22 March 2021, the United States, European Union, Canada, and United Kingdom imposed coordinated parallel sanctions on four Chinese officials and the XPCC. In December 2021, the independent Uyghur Tribunal delivered its verdict concluding beyond reasonable doubt that the Chinese government had committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghur people.

2022: The OHCHR Report and Growing International Action

In August 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a long-awaited report concluding that serious human rights violations in East Turkistan may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. In November 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination formally referred the East Turkistan situation to the UN Office on Genocide Prevention, the most significant institutional escalation of the issue within the UN system.

2023 to 2025: Repression Normalised and Deepened

Ma Xingrui, who replaced Chen Quanguo as "Xinjiang" party secretary in December 2021, oversaw a deliberate transformation of the repression from visible and confrontational to invisible and structural. The infrastructure of genocide was preserved; its aesthetics were changed. Key developments included: the continuation of forced labour at record levels; the exponential expansion of the boarding school system; the passage in February 2024 of new regulations formally mandating the "Sinicisation" of all religious practice; and the preparation of the Ethnic Unity Law.

2025 to 2026: New Exposés and New Laws

Zhang Yabo, a Han Chinese police officer who served in "Xinjiang" from 2014 to 2023, fled to Germany in August 2025 and made contact with the World Uyghur Congress. His testimony, verified by Dr. Adrian Zenz of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and published in Der Spiegel in April 2026, constitutes the most detailed insider account yet obtained from within the Chinese security apparatus.

The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (the Ethnic Unity Law) was adopted by the National People's Congress on 12 March 2026, with 2,756 votes in favour, three against, and three abstentions. Effective 1 July 2026, the law mandates Mandarin as the primary language of instruction in all schools and requires all persons to adopt "a correct view" of history, ethnicity, culture, and religion as defined by the CCP. Human rights scholars and UN experts have described the law as the "legal codification of cultural genocide."



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