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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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**Uyghur Genocide and Concentrated  
Reeducation Camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur  
Autonomous Region of the People's Republic  
of China**

October 2024

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

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This report is provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in response to section 7408 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Pub. L. No. 118-31) and section 6504(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Pub. L. No. 117-263). It presents an unclassified summary that details the People's Republic of China's (PRC) human rights abuses of the Uyghur people, including atrocities committed to suppress the Uyghur culture, and internment facilities in Xinjiang; activities, funding, and security at the camps; and the government and commercial entities that benefit from coercive labor practices. The report includes a classified annex.

This product was drafted by ODNI's National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Officer for China.

## **UYGHUR GENOCIDE**

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In 2014, Beijing launched the "Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism" to eradicate religious extremism from Turkic Muslim communities—building on policies and practices to suppress cultural identity in the Xinjiang region since the 1950s. This ongoing campaign includes mass incarceration and forced labor, suppression of Uyghur religious practices, political indoctrination, torture, sexual violence, forced sterilization, forced contraception, forced abortion, and family separations, according to reports from former detainees, victims, and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The PRC employs a robust surveillance network to enforce its policies, including use of facial recognition and biometric technology to track individuals, GPS tracking of vehicles, and requirements to monitor Uyghurs' activities.

## **COVERED CAMPS AND DETAINMENTS**

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The PRC's "Strike Hard" campaign against Uyghurs and other ethnic minority Muslims has evolved over time. Following its launch in 2014, officials allegedly began implementing a system to re-educate or suppress cultural identity. Officials reportedly escalated the campaign in 2017, increasing the number of victims detained without trial and subject to political indoctrination. During these periods, victims were detained primarily in internment facilities—which PRC officials referred to as vocational education centers—located in China's northwestern Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but some Uyghurs also have been subject to detention or forced labor in facilities located in other provinces. Since 2019, PRC authorities have attempted to conceal extra-judicial detention in Xinjiang; as a result, Uyghurs and other ethnic minority Muslims also have been detained in the PRC's formal detention network—including prisons—and forced labor may occur in facilities separate from detention facilities. In 2019, commercial imagery analysis indicated a significant reduction in security features at some internment centers, alongside an expansion of formal, legal prisons in Xinjiang.

The IC does not know how many individuals have been administratively detained or arrested by PRC authorities in Xinjiang since the "Strike Hard" campaign began, and the PRC has refused to provide any estimated figure. Various human rights NGOs and government

sources have developed estimates, although they cover different time periods and may use different assumptions causing them to appear contradictory. PRC state media reports and data from Xinjiang’s law enforcement organizations collected by human rights NGOs indicate that from 2014 through 2022—the last date for which authorities have issued such reports—PRC authorities significantly increased the number of persons formally arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced as compared with the average figures for the five years before 2014.

- In 2019, the U.S. Department of State estimated that, as of that date, more than one million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other traditionally Muslim Turkic minority persons had been detained extrajudicially, without trial, for indefinite periods. This year, NGO estimates based on official PRC law enforcement and NGO-gathered statistics indicated that more than 400,000 persons remained formally imprisoned in Xinjiang, many having served very lengthy sentences; this figure does not include persons administratively detained.
- Other NGOs and independent analysts have estimated that from 2017–2021, between 800,000 to three million persons were detained without trial and subjected to political indoctrination and forced ethnic and religious assimilation. In addition to full-time detentions, Xinjiang authorities reportedly compelled another one to two million persons, including ethnic Kazakhs and other minorities, to undergo daytime-only ideological and anti-religious reeducation in so-called “open camps” during the first years of the campaign, according to a human rights NGO.
- Since 2019, the government in Xinjiang reportedly has moved a large but unknown number of detainees out of the reeducation camps, sending some to factory labor, returning others to surveillance in their home areas, and formally prosecuting and sentencing many as criminals to long prison terms. In 2022, the Xinjiang Government reported that it had prosecuted more than 500,000 people since 2017. Xinjiang law enforcement authorities reported that only some of these persons were prosecuted in connection with the “Strike Hard” campaign, but the continued elevated number of indictments in 2022 suggests that the campaign continues.

## **TYPES OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT IN COVERED CAMPS**

The Xinjiang civilian police forces—including from the Xinjiang regional departments of the Ministries of Public Security and Justice—have provided officers and staff to administer and enforce detainee security in the camps, according to party documents and data reportedly obtained from local public security bureaus in Xinjiang. Armed police units—probably from the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP)—guard the camps with assault rifles to prevent escapes and securely transport detainees between facilities. The police intimidate and control inmates through watchtowers with machine guns, snipers around the perimeter, and the use of blindfolds, handcuffs, and shackles. Former victims have reported other tools and equipment used in the camps to conduct forced sterilization, as well as the use of torture equipment that produced electric shocks.

## **ROLE OF THE SECURITY SERVICES OF THE PRC AND THE XINJIANG PRODUCTION AND CONSTRUCTION CORPS IN ENFORCING ATROCITIES AT COVERED CAMPS**

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Authorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have adopted a whole-of-government approach to the PRC's campaign against alleged "extremism," assigning tasks to virtually all government departments in a key 2018 regulation.

- Xinjiang's public security (civilian police) and justice departments—which oversee prisons—are responsible for a wide-array of activities involved in enforcing the internment of citizens. A Chinese Communist Party directive from 2017 had previously assigned both of these departments to the party-run "teams," which administered detention centers in each of Xinjiang's municipalities and counties, according to leaked Xinjiang party, government, and police files.
- The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) is an autonomous sub provincial state-run entity within Xinjiang responsible for commercial and paramilitary activities including administering cities, providing public services, running publicly traded companies and industrial parks, and operating prisons. The XPCC has its own contingent of PAP forces to assist with detaining and guarding prisoners, according to PRC press reporting. U.S. Government reports suggest the XPCC offers a variety of subsidies and benefits to companies that establish factories in the region and make use of internment labor, but we are unable to determine whether the XPCC and its affiliated companies are using forced labor connected to reeducation camps.

According to many former detainees and some former camp officials, conditions in the centers include factory labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, food deprivation, beatings, and sexual abuse enforced or perpetuated by police forces. The application of torture as part of the PRC's campaign is widespread and systematic, according to human rights NGOs, scholars, journalists, and even some former PRC camp officials.

## **PRC GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR COVERED CAMPS**

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We do not have specific information detailing the amount or flow of funding from the PRC Government to camps in Xinjiang. Government support has reportedly included direct funding to build detention facilities and incentive programs to encourage companies to build factories near the camps and train inmates for factory work.

- According to a leaked speech by then-Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi from 2018, the PRC National Reform and Development Commission supported 27 projects worth \$344 million for expanding prisons and constructing new detention facilities, as well as supporting XPCC for additional projects related to detention facilities.
- In 2010, the PRC established a "mutual pairing assistance" program to encourage PRC companies to establish satellite factories in Xinjiang, according to a U.S. Department of the Treasury business advisory and press reporting. As of 2021, at least 19 cities

and provinces from other parts of the PRC reportedly were participating in this program and invested billions of Chinese yuan to build factories in Xinjiang. Some of these factories directly used compulsory labor and others reportedly took advantage of abusive and restrictive labor practices.

- The XPCC, as a state-run corporate and paramilitary organization, attracts industrial activity in Xinjiang by providing benefits such as reduced rents and utilities at its industrial parks; logistics support, such as warehousing and transport of finished goods; tax and other financial incentives; and free office space, according to a U.S. Department of the Treasury business advisory.

## **XPCC ENTITIES AND SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES**

The XPCC also operates publicly traded companies associated with various industries, particularly cotton and other agricultural products, chemicals, and polysilicon products. The organization has more than 2,900 domestic and foreign subsidiaries, according to a nonprofit organization report. Despite U.S. and European sanctions, the XPCC remains connected to the global economy and international financial system through domestic and regional trade, use of foreign subsidiaries, non-sanctioned subsidiaries, and integration in financial markets. The XPCC engages with foreign counterparts to establish cooperative programs on behalf of Xinjiang-based PRC companies. Primary foreign commercial engagement occurs regionally and in Central Asia, such as with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Uzbekistan, but obscure supply chains within the PRC and intentional mislabeling of supply sources risks enabling the integration of XPCC-origin products into the global market.

Since 2019, the United States has imposed various restrictions and sanctions on the XPCC or individuals and businesses associated with the organization.

- The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued economic sanctions on the XPCC, as well as on three individuals who are current or former leaders in the organization. Sanctioned current or former XPCC officials include Mr. Sun Jinlong, a former Political Commissar of the XPCC; Mr. Peng Jiarui, the Deputy Party Secretary and Commander of the XPCC; and Mr. Wang Junzheng, the former Secretary of the Party Committee of the XPCC.
- The U.S. Department of Commerce designated the XPCC and XPCC Public Security Bureau on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) “Entity List” under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) because of XPCC’s connection to human rights abuses or repression in Xinjiang. This action imposes licensing requirements before the sale or transfer of certain U.S. items to the XPCC or XPCC Public Security Bureau, with a presumption of license denial for most items.

## **OTHER PRC BUSINESSES INVOLVED WITH THE ATROCITIES IN XINJIANG OR SUPPORTING PRC POLICIES IN THE REGION**

As of October 2024, the United States had identified and taken actions against PRC businesses because of their involvement in abusive labor practices or other human rights violations in Xinjiang.

- The U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued Withhold Release Orders for: Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd; Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co., Ltd.; Lop County Meixin Hair Product Co., Ltd.; Lop County No. 4 Vocational Skills Education and Training Center; Lop County Hair Product Industrial Park; Yili Zhuowan Garment Manufacturing Co., Ltd. and Baodin LYSZD Trade and Business Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Junggar Cotton and Linen Co., Ltd.; Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co., Ltd.; and Hoshine Silicon Industry Co., Ltd.
- The U.S. Department of Commerce has added to the BIS EAR “entity list” the following companies: Dahua Technology; Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd.; IFLYTEK; Megvii Technology; Beijing Sensetime Technology Development Co., Ltd.; Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co., Ltd.; Yitu Technologies; Yixin Science and Technology Co., Ltd.; Aksu Huafu Textiles Co.; CloudWalk Technology; FiberHome Technologies Group and subsidiary Nanjing FiberHome Starrisky Communication Development Co.; Netposa and subsidiary SenseNets; Intellifusion; IS’Vision; Beijing Liuhe BGI; Changji Esquel Textile Co., Ltd.; Hefei Bitland Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Hefei Meiling Co., Ltd.; Hetian Haolin Hair Accessories Co., Ltd.; Hetian Taida Apparel Co., Ltd.; KTK Group; Nanchang O-Film Tech; Nanjing Synergy Textiles Co., Ltd.; Tanyuan Technology Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Silk Road BGI; Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Daqo New Energy Co., Ltd; Xinjiang East Hope Nonferrous Metals Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang GCL New Energy Material Technology Co., Ltd; China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology; Xinjiang Lianhai Chuangzhi Information Technology Co, Ltd.; Leon Technology Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Tangli Technology Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Cobber Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Xinjiang Sailing Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Beijing Geling Shentong Information Technology Co., Ltd.; Tongfang R.I.A. Co., Ltd.; Shenzhen Hua’antai Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.; Chengdu Xiwu Security System Alliance Co., Ltd.; Beijing Sinonet Science & Technology Co., Ltd.; Urumqi Tianyao Weiye Information Technology Service Co., Ltd.; Suzhou Keda Technology Co., Ltd.; and Xinjiang Beidou Tongchuang Information Technology Co., Ltd.