The dramatic collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the subsequent rise of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led interim government have fundamentally altered Syria’s geopolitical landscape, creating a dynamic arena for global powers to advance their strategic interests. China, a steadfast supporter of Assad through its vetoes at the UN Security Council and modest economic investments, has swiftly pivoted to engage the new Syrian leadership. This engagement is driven by ambitions to expand the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and assert greater influence in the Middle East. However, China’s policies toward the Uyghur Muslim population in East Turkestan—widely condemned as involving mass detentions, forced labor, and cultural suppression—pose a significant challenge to its diplomatic overtures in Muslim-majority Syria. This article, provides an exhaustive examination of the evolving China-Syria relationship, with a particular emphasis on the Uyghur human rights crisis as a pivotal factor shaping bilateral ties, regional dynamics, and the contrasting positions of Syria, China, and Western nations.

Historical Context of China-Syria Relations

China’s pre-2024 relationship with Syria was anchored in a policy of non-intervention and selective economic engagement. As a permanent UN Security Council member, China consistently blocked resolutions targeting Assad’s regime, aligning with Russia to counter Western-led initiatives for sanctions or military intervention (South China Morning Post [SCMP], May 3, 2025). This stance was rooted in China’s broader foreign policy doctrine of respecting state sovereignty, a principle that resonated with Assad’s government amid its protracted civil war. Economically, China’s involvement in Syria was limited by the conflict’s intensity, though it pursued small-scale investments in energy, infrastructure, and trade, often framed under the BRI (Lebanon24, January 2025). These projects, such as oil exploration and port development, were curtailed by security concerns but signaled China’s long-term interest in Syria’s strategic location.

On the Uyghur issue, the Assad regime maintained a conspicuous silence, reflecting its dependence on Chinese diplomatic and economic support. East Turkestan, under Chinese control since its colonization in 1884 and fully subsumed under the Chinese Communist Party’s authority in October 1949, has been a focal point of international contention due to Beijing’s policies toward its Uyghur population (BBC Arabic, January 2025). Assad’s government, reliant on China’s UN vetoes, endorsed Beijing’s narrative that its actions in East Turkestan were counterterrorism measures, avoiding any criticism that might jeopardize bilateral ties (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). This historical alignment provides a foundation for China’s current strategy, which seeks to leverage past goodwill while navigating the ideological and socio-cultural complexities of HTS’s governance.

China’s Strategic Engagement with the HTS-Led Government

The fall of Assad in December 2024 prompted an immediate and pragmatic response from China, which recognized the HTS-led government as a potential partner despite its designation as a terrorist organization by Western nations. Within weeks, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting an “inclusive and stable” Syria, signaling readiness to engage with HTS (SCMP, December 18, 2024). This outreach culminated in high-level diplomatic exchanges, including a meeting between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Chinese officials at the United Nations in April 2025, where Shaibani advocated for a “strategic partnership” to bolster economic cooperation (SCMP, April 28, 2025). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi further emphasized reconstruction and stability in subsequent talks, underscoring China’s commitment to Syria’s post-conflict recovery (SCMP, May 3, 2025). Syrian media reported that HTS leader Mohammad al-Bashir met a Chinese delegation in March 2025 to discuss investment prospects, highlighting Syria’s urgent need for capital to rebuild its war-torn economy (Syria TV, March 2025).

China’s engagement is driven by a confluence of strategic objectives:

Economic Expansion: Syria’s reconstruction, estimated to cost between $250 and $400 billion, presents a lucrative opportunity for Chinese firms under the BRI. Projects in infrastructure (roads, railways, ports), energy (oil and gas), and telecommunications are prioritized, with Chinese companies like China Railway Construction Corporation poised to lead (Washington Institute, January 2025; SANA, April 2025). These initiatives align with China’s broader goal of integrating Syria into its regional trade networks.

Geopolitical Influence: By engaging HTS, China seeks to position itself as a neutral mediator in the Middle East, challenging U.S. dominance and enhancing its role in multilateral forums like the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (SCMP, May 3, 2025). This move also counters Western isolationism, presenting China as a reliable partner for post-conflict states.

Regional Stability: A stable Syria is critical for securing China’s trade routes through Iraq and Turkey, which are integral to the BRI’s connectivity across Eurasia (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). Stability also mitigates risks to Chinese investments in neighboring countries.

Despite these ambitions, the Uyghur human rights crisis in East Turkestan introduces a significant risk, given Syria’s Muslim-majority population, HTS’s Islamist roots, and the region’s sensitivity to Muslim oppression (BBC Arabic, January 2025).

The Uyghur Human Rights Crisis: A Global and Regional Flashpoint

China’s policies in East Turkestan, a region colonized by China in 1884 and brought under the Chinese Communist Party’s control in October 1949, have been widely condemned as severe human rights violations. The Uyghur Muslim population, numbering approximately 12 million, has faced mass detentions in internment camps (housing over one million individuals), forced labor in industries such as cotton, textiles, and solar panel production, and systematic cultural erasure through bans on religious practices, the Uyghur language, and traditional customs (BBC Arabic, January 2025). Reports from the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch describe these actions as potential “crimes against humanity,” with the United States and European Union labeling them as “genocide” and imposing sanctions on Chinese officials and entities (Washington Institute, January 2025).

In Muslim-majority countries, responses to the Uyghur crisis are shaped by economic and geopolitical considerations. Nations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates, heavily reliant on Chinese investments, have either remained silent or endorsed Beijing’s claim that its policies in East Turkestan are counterterrorism measures (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). However, public sentiment in these countries often diverges, with grassroots movements and social media campaigns expressing solidarity with Uyghurs. In Syria, the Uyghur issue is particularly resonant due to several factors:

HTS’s Pragmatic Calculus: HTS leader Mohammad al-Bashir has refrained from commenting on East Turkestan, prioritizing economic reconstruction over ideological disputes (Syria News, April 2025). This approach mirrors the Assad regime’s silence but risks alienating domestic constituencies sympathetic to the Uyghur cause (SCMP, April 28, 2025).

Public Sentiment: Syria’s Sunni-majority population, shaped by its own experiences of oppression under Assad, views the Uyghur crisis through the lens of Muslim solidarity. Social media campaigns and protests in HTS-controlled areas, particularly Idlib, have called for action on East Turkestan, drawing parallels with Syria’s struggle (BBC Arabic, January 2025). These movements could pressure HTS to address the issue, even if symbolically.

Regional Influences: Turkey, a key supporter of HTS, has been a vocal critic of China’s Uyghur policies, hosting a significant Uyghur diaspora and raising the issue at international forums like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). Turkey’s influence in Syria, particularly in HTS-controlled northern regions, could push the interim government to adopt a more critical stance (Washington Institute, January 2025).

Historical Precedents: The Uyghur issue has occasionally surfaced in Syria’s public discourse, with rebel groups during the civil war expressing solidarity with East Turkestan’s Muslims. This historical awareness amplifies the issue’s salience under HTS’s rule (BBC Arabic, January 2025).

Lebanon24 (January 2025) warns that any Syrian criticism of China’s policies in East Turkestan could trigger a regional backlash, potentially disrupting BRI projects in countries like Iraq, Jordan, and Pakistan. Conversely, SANA (April 2025) highlights China’s efforts to align its counterterrorism narrative with HTS’s anti-ISIS stance, framing the Uyghur issue as a shared security concern to neutralize potential criticism (SANA, April 2025).

Syria’s Position: Economic Imperatives and Ideological Pressures

The HTS-led government operates in a context of acute economic desperation, with Syria’s infrastructure devastated, its economy in ruins, and 15 million people requiring humanitarian aid (Washington Institute, January 2025). The promise of Chinese investment—potentially $10–20 billion in initial reconstruction projects—makes Beijing a critical partner (Washington Institute, January 2025). Syrian media outlets, including SANA and Syria News, have emphasized the transformative potential of Chinese involvement in railways, energy grids, and port rehabilitation, framing Beijing as a reliable ally in Syria’s post-conflict recovery (SANA, April 2025; Syria News, April 2025). Discussions between HTS leader Mohammad al-Bashir and Chinese delegations in March 2025 underscored Syria’s eagerness to secure these investments, with proposals for special economic zones and joint ventures (Syria TV, March 2025).

However, HTS faces formidable ideological and socio-political pressures that complicate its alignment with China:

Domestic Expectations: Syria’s Sunni-majority population, having endured years of conflict and repression, identifies strongly with global Muslim causes. The Uyghur crisis in East Turkestan resonates deeply, with protests in Idlib and social media campaigns demanding HTS take a stand (BBC Arabic, January 2025). These grassroots movements threaten HTS’s domestic legitimacy if it prioritizes economic ties over moral solidarity.

Islamist Credentials: HTS’s historical ties to al-Qaeda and its current efforts to project a moderate, governance-focused image create a delicate balancing act. Addressing the Uyghur issue could bolster its credibility among supporters but risks antagonizing China, a key economic partner (BBC Arabic, January 2025). HTS’s rhetoric, which emphasizes justice and Islamic values, may compel symbolic gestures to appease its base.

Regional Dynamics: Turkey, a primary backer of HTS, has leveraged the Uyghur issue to assert moral authority in the Muslim world, hosting Uyghur diaspora communities and advocating for their rights (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). Turkey’s influence in northern Syria could push HTS to adopt a nuanced stance, potentially issuing statements on East Turkestan to align with Ankara’s position. Conversely, Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which maintain silence on East Turkestan due to Chinese investments, may encourage HTS to remain neutral to preserve regional cohesion (Lebanon24, January 2025).

Public Opinion Dynamics: The Syrian public’s awareness of the Uyghur crisis is amplified by global media and diaspora networks, particularly in Turkey and Europe. This awareness could escalate if HTS fails to address the issue, potentially fueling unrest in HTS-controlled areas (BBC Arabic, January 2025).

Syria News (April 2025) suggests that HTS may adopt a dual strategy: maintaining robust economic ties with China while issuing carefully worded statements on East Turkestan to placate domestic and regional audiences. This approach, observed in other Muslim-majority nations like Indonesia, could mitigate tensions but risks falling short of public expectations (Syria News, April 2025).

China’s Position: Economic Diplomacy and Human Rights Deflection

China’s Syrian policy is firmly rooted in its non-interference doctrine and economic diplomacy, leveraging its financial clout to secure strategic advantages. Beijing frames its policies in East Turkestan as counterterrorism measures, a narrative that aligns with HTS’s own anti-ISIS rhetoric and security priorities (SANA, April 2025). Economically, China’s promise of substantial reconstruction investments—potentially $10–20 billion in initial projects—gives it significant leverage over HTS’s priorities (Washington Institute, January 2025). Chinese state media portrays Syria as a flagship BRI project, contrasting its unconditional aid with the restrictive sanctions imposed by Western nations (SCMP, December 18, 2024). This narrative underscores China’s role as a partner willing to engage without preconditions, appealing to Syria’s urgent need for reconstruction.

To neutralize the Uyghur issue, China employs a multifaceted strategy:

Economic Incentives: Offering debt relief, preferential trade agreements, and infrastructure financing to ensure Syria’s alignment (Lebanon24, January 2025). For instance, China has proposed funding for a Damascus-Aleppo railway, contingent on Syria’s diplomatic cooperation (Syria TV, March 2025).

Narrative Control: Emphasizing shared counterterrorism goals to deflect criticism of East Turkestan. Chinese officials have highlighted parallels between HTS’s fight against ISIS and China’s policies in East Turkestan, framing both as efforts to combat extremism (SANA, April 2025).

Regional Precedents: Drawing on successful alignments with Muslim-majority nations like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which prioritize economic partnerships over human rights concerns in East Turkestan (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). China’s experience with these countries informs its confidence that Syria will follow suit.

Diplomatic Engagement: Intensifying bilateral dialogues to preempt criticism, including cultural exchanges and scholarships for Syrian students to study in China (SCMP, May 3, 2025).

However, China remains acutely aware of the Uyghur issue’s potential to disrupt its Middle East ambitions. Lebanon24 (January 2025) notes that Beijing may escalate diplomatic efforts to secure Syria’s silence, potentially offering additional economic concessions or leveraging its influence in regional forums like the Arab League. China’s proactive engagement reflects a calculated strategy to mitigate risks while capitalizing on Syria’s economic vulnerabilities.

Western Nations’ Position: Human Rights Advocacy and Strategic Constraints

Western nations, led by the United States and the European Union, approach Syria’s HTS-led government with caution, constrained by security concerns and HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization due to its historical al-Qaeda ties. The Washington Institute (January 2025) argues that the U.S. conditions any engagement on HTS demonstrating inclusivity, protecting minority rights, and actively combating terrorism, with existing sanctions on Syria remaining a primary policy tool (Washington Institute, January 2025). The Uyghur human rights crisis in East Turkestan is a cornerstone of Western policy toward China, with the U.S. and EU imposing sanctions on Chinese officials and entities and urging Muslim-majority nations to critique Beijing’s actions (BBC Arabic, January 2025).

Western strategies face significant obstacles:

Limited Leverage: Unlike China, Western nations have offered minimal reconstruction aid to Syria, reducing their influence over HTS’s priorities (Washington Institute, January 2025). The U.S. has allocated limited humanitarian assistance but stopped short of committing to large-scale infrastructure projects, citing security risks (SCMP, May 3, 2025).

Sanctions Dilemma: Sanctions, including the Caesar Act, exacerbate Syria’s humanitarian crisis, affecting 15 million people in need of aid (Washington Institute, January 2025). This has sparked debates within Western capitals about humanitarian exemptions, with critics arguing that sanctions inadvertently strengthen China’s position by limiting Western engagement (SCMP, May 3, 2025).

Uyghur Advocacy: The U.S. has actively encouraged HTS to raise the Uyghur issue in its dealings with China, framing it as a litmus test for HTS’s commitment to human rights and global Muslim solidarity (BBC Arabic, January 2025). However, Syria’s economic dependence on China undermines the effectiveness of this advocacy, as HTS prioritizes reconstruction over moral posturing (Washington Institute, January 2025).

Internal Divisions: Western nations are divided on how to engage Syria. While the U.S. maintains a hardline stance, some European countries, like France and Germany, advocate for limited engagement to counter China and Russia’s growing influence (SCMP, May 3, 2025).

The Washington Institute (January 2025) proposes that the U.S. adopt a dual strategy to curb China’s influence: offering targeted reconstruction aid tied to governance reforms and easing sanctions to facilitate humanitarian relief. However, domestic political constraints and security concerns limit the feasibility of this approach, leaving Western nations at a disadvantage compared to China’s proactive engagement (Washington Institute, January 2025). BBC Arabic (January 2025) notes that Western advocacy for Uyghur rights risks alienating HTS, particularly if it is perceived as hypocritical given the West’s limited economic support.

Geopolitical Implications

The interplay of China’s engagement with Syria, the Uyghur human rights crisis in East Turkestan, and Western policies reflects a broader contest for influence in the Middle East:

China’s Rising Influence: A successful partnership with HTS could cement China’s non-interference model as a viable alternative to Western interventionism, appealing to other post-conflict states like Iraq and Yemen (SCMP, May 3, 2025). Syria’s integration into the BRI could also enhance China’s regional trade networks, strengthening its economic dominance. However, failure to address Uyghur concerns could erode Beijing’s credibility in the Muslim world, particularly if public backlash in Syria amplifies the issue (Lebanon24, January 2025).

Uyghur Risks: Syrian criticism of China’s policies in East Turkestan could trigger a domino effect, inspiring other Muslim-majority nations to challenge Beijing. This would threaten BRI projects in countries like Pakistan, Jordan, and Egypt, where public sentiment on East Turkestan is already simmering (Lebanon24, January 2025). Such a scenario could also embolden Uyghur diaspora networks, particularly in Turkey, to escalate advocacy efforts (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025).

Western Decline: The West’s cautious approach risks ceding Syria to China and Russia, undermining U.S. and EU influence in the Middle East (Washington Institute, January 2025). Advocacy for Uyghur rights, while morally compelling, lacks traction without substantial economic incentives to sway HTS. The West’s reliance on sanctions further alienates Syria, pushing it closer to Beijing (SCMP, May 3, 2025).

Turkey’s Pivotal Role: As a primary backer of HTS and a vocal advocate for Uyghur rights, Turkey occupies a unique position. Its influence in northern Syria could amplify the Uyghur issue, particularly if HTS seeks to align with Ankara’s regional ambitions (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025). However, Turkey’s own economic ties with China, including BRI projects, may temper its advocacy, creating a complex dynamic (Syria TV, March 2025).

The China-Syria relationship thus serves as a microcosm of global power competition, with the Uyghur crisis acting as a critical fault line. The outcome will depend on HTS’s ability to navigate domestic and regional pressures, China’s diplomatic agility, and the West’s willingness to adapt its strategy.

Future Scenarios

Several scenarios could shape the trajectory of China-Syria relations and the Uyghur issue:

1. Pragmatic Alignment: HTS prioritizes Chinese investment, maintaining silence on East Turkestan to secure reconstruction funds. This scenario strengthens China’s regional influence but risks domestic unrest among Syrians sympathetic to Uyghurs, potentially undermining HTS’s legitimacy (Syria News, April 2025).
2. Symbolic Criticism: HTS issues mild, carefully worded statements on East Turkestan to appease domestic and regional audiences, while preserving economic ties with China. This approach, observed in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, could mitigate tensions but may fail to satisfy public demands (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025).
3. Western Engagement: Increased Western aid and sanctions relief prompt HTS to raise the Uyghur issue, straining China-Syria relations. This scenario is unlikely given current Western caution and limited financial commitments (Washington Institute, January 2025).
4. Regional Escalation: Heightened tensions between Turkey and China over Uyghur rights force HTS to take a public stance, potentially disrupting China’s BRI plans in Syria and beyond. Such a scenario could escalate if other Muslim-majority nations follow suit (Lebanon24, January 2025).
5. Grassroots Uprising: Growing public discontent in Syria, fueled by social media and diaspora networks, compels HTS to adopt a more assertive stance on East Turkestan, even at the cost of economic ties with China. This scenario, though less likely, could reshape regional dynamics if protests gain traction (BBC Arabic, January 2025).

Policy Recommendations

To navigate the complex interplay of China-Syria relations and the Uyghur issue, stakeholders should consider the following:

For Syria (HTS): Adopt a balanced approach by securing Chinese investment while issuing measured statements on East Turkestan to maintain domestic and regional credibility. Engaging Turkey as a mediator could help navigate these tensions without alienating China (Al-Istiqlal, January 2025).

For Western Nations: Increase reconstruction aid tied to governance reforms and ease sanctions to compete with China’s influence. Amplify Uyghur advocacy through multilateral forums like the UN, leveraging Turkey’s influence to pressure HTS (Washington Institute, January 2025).

For Turkey: Use its leverage over HTS to advocate for Uyghur rights while balancing economic ties with China. Coordinating with Western allies could enhance its regional influence without escalating tensions with Beijing (Syria TV, March 2025).

Conclusion

China’s engagement with Syria’s HTS-led government represents a strategic bid to expand its influence in the Middle East, leveraging economic diplomacy to secure reconstruction contracts and counter Western dominance. However, the Uyghur human rights crisis in East Turkestan, a region under Chinese control since 1884 and fully integrated under Communist rule in 1949, poses a formidable challenge. Syria’s economic desperation favors alignment with China, yet public sentiment, HTS’s Islamist roots, and Turkey’s advocacy for Uyghurs could elevate the issue as a point of contention. Western nations, while championing Uyghur rights, struggle to counter China’s leverage due to their reliance on sanctions and limited engagement. The China-Syria relationship thus encapsulates a broader geopolitical struggle, with the Uyghur crisis serving as a critical test of moral and strategic priorities. As Syria navigates its post-Assad future, its response to the Uyghur issue will not only shape its ties with China but also influence its standing in the Muslim world and the global order. The resolution of these dynamics will have far-reaching implications for Middle Eastern geopolitics, the BRI’s viability, and the global human rights agenda.

References

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• South China Morning Post. (2025, May 3). “Will Syria Challenges Stand in the Way of China’s Middle East Ambitions?”
• BBC Arabic. (2024, December 20). “Syria: What Does the Future Hold After Assad’s Fall?”
• BBC Arabic. (2025, January). “Podcast: Syria’s New Chapter.”
• Al-Istiqlal. (2025, January). “Will HTS’s Pragmatism Lead to Stronger China-Syria Ties?”
• Lebanon24. (2025, January). “Will Syria’s Challenges Hinder China’s Middle East Ambitions?”
• Washington Institute for Near East Policy. (2025, January). “Curbing China’s Influence in the New Syrian Government.”
• Syria TV. (2025, March). “HTS Leader Discusses Investment Prospects with Chinese Delegation.”
• SANA. (2025, April). “Syria Welcomes Chinese Support for Reconstruction.”
• Syria News. (2025, April). “Syria’s New Government Seeks Economic Ties with China.”

https://www.uysi.org/ug/xitay-suriye_munasiwetliri_we_uyghur_mesilisi/